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I.  Introduction 
  It is generally argued that foreign ownership of banks increases competition and 
efficiency in the banking sector of the host country, reduces risk exposures through greater 
geographical and industrial diversification, and enlarges the aggregate quantity of capital 
invested in the banking sector.  Indeed, foreign entry through direct investment is widely 
recommended by researchers and analysts as a means of strengthening weak and inefficient 
banking structures, particularly in emerging economies.  This is because banks that are willing 
and able to enter a foreign country, especially developing economies, through direct investments 
are generally larger, in healthier financial condition, more professionally managed, and more 
technically advanced than the average host country banks, and may therefore be expected to raise 
the bar for all banks.  
Foreign ownership of banks varies greatly among countries.  In the European Union, for 
example, Table 1 shows that foreign ownership averages 58% in the ten new EU member states 
as compared with a weighted average of 16% for the older EU members.
1   
Despite the benefits that might accrue to foreign ownership, cross-border banking 
through either branching or subsidiaries raises a number of important policy issues when 
financial instability threatens.  These concerns are particularly important with respect to the 
provision of deposit insurance, the effectiveness of prudential regulation, the strength of market 
discipline, the timing of declaring an insolvent institution officially insolvent and placing it in 
receivership or conservatorship, and the procedures for resolving bank insolvencies.   
                                                 
1 See European Commission (2005).   
  2
Because the actual or perceived adverse externalities of bank failures may be large, it is 
important to evaluate how banking regulatory structures are likely to function within and across 
countries at times of financial strain as well as at times when banks are performing well 
financially.  An effective regulatory structure should not only foster competition and efficiency 
in good times, but also should aim to minimize the cost of any adverse externalities associated 
with insolvencies.  This would include avoiding the probability of adopting hasty, ad hoc, 
automatic reflex public policy measures once a crisis emerges that protects most if not all 
stakeholders against loss.  While expedient solutions may appear to minimize the cost of 
insolvencies in the short-run, they may do so only at the expense of even higher longer-term 
costs because the necessary actions were not taken much earlier. In addition, in the case of cross-
border banking, competing interests of stakeholders in the home country versus those in the host 
country can raise important agency problems that may affect how financially distressed banking 
organizations are resolved, the incidence of possible externalities associated with failure, and 
both the magnitude and the distribution of the costs among affected parties when failures do 
occur.
2  
While the benefits of cross-border banking conducted through foreign-owned banking 
offices have been analyzed intensely, the implications that alternative regulatory structures have 
for resolving problems, should these institutions experience financial distress, have been 
analyzed far less. This paper extends the extent literature by examining these latter issues in 
greater depth.
3 Emphasis is on the European Union, which is both economically and financially 
                                                 
2 See Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2001). 
3 Reviews of the benefits appear in Caprio, et. al. (forthcoming), Committee on the Global Financial System (2004), 
Goldberg (2003) and  Soussa (2004).  Brief previous warnings about the unsettled state of affairs in cross-border 
banking appear in Goodhart (2005), Eisenbeis (2005), and Mayes (2005).    See in particular the analysis of the 
Nordea Bank, which is headquartered in Sweden but operates in a number of other countries in the appendix to 
Mayes (2005). 
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large and has several features relating to cross-border banking in the form of direct investment 
that may heighten the problems we consider.  These features include the provision of a single 
banking license, reliance upon the home country as the primary provider of deposit insurance 
and application of the bankruptcy processes and host country responsibility for financial stability 
and lender of last resort.   It should be emphasized that the issues being faced by the EU are not 
unique and are common  to most countries subject to cross-border banking.  Indeed, the EU has 
at least attempted to harmonize policies, and for this reason may be ahead of other parts of the 
world in facing the problems.  Nevertheless, the sooner all countries face up to the problems that 
crises bring, the less vulnerable their financial systems will be.    
In the next section we describe the EU cross-border banking regulatory structure in 
greater depth to set the background for subsequent analysis.  Section III discusses agency 
problems that may arise in the supervision and regulation of cross-border banking institutions in 
the EU.  Section IV focuses on the problems of providing deposit insurance for institutions 
operating in that environment, and Section V looks at insolvency resolution.  Section VI. 
examines issues concerning the payout from deposit insurance plans and resolving large bank 
failures and Section VII suggests ways to solve the problems.  Section VII argues for 
modification of the new European Company Statute as it applies to banking organizations to 
require agreement by banks desiring to establish branches across and over borders to be subject 
to both a system of prompt corrective action and be required to give up its charter at a positive 
capitol-to-asset ratio.  The last section is a summary and conclusion. 
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II. Key Features of EU Financial Regulatory and Deposit Guarantee Systems 
The European Union is in the midst of an economic transition from a collection of 
separate country economies into a single economic market.  As part of this integration, the 
Masstricht Treaty of 1992 established the ground work for introduction of the EURO in 1999 
and establishment of the European Central Bank.  But it left to the individual member countries 
responsibility for banking supervision and regulation, financial stability, lender of last resort 
functions, and the provision of deposit insurance guarantees.
4   
As part of an effort to encourage the development of a single economic market, the 
Second Banking Directive (1988) as modified in 1995 established three principles – 
harmonization, mutual recognition and home country control.  Harmonization requires that a 
minimum set of uniform banking regulations be adopted across the Union.  Mutual recognition 
means that during the transition to a single market, member countries would honor the 
regulations and policies of the other member states.  Finally, regulation and supervision by the 
“home country” (country of charter) would  have precedent over regulation and supervision by a 
“host country.”  Together with the concept of a single license, these three principles mean that, 
once a banking institution receives a charter from an EU member state, it would be permitted to 
establish branches anywhere within the EU without the necessity of review by the regulators in 
the host countries into which it expanded.  When entry takes place in a host EU country by way 
of a separately chartered subsidiary, rather than through a branch office, the host country is 
responsible for supervision and regulation of that entity, since it is the home country for that 
subsidiary.  At the same time, supervision of the consolidated entity remains the responsibility of 
the home country.   
                                                 
4  See Mayes and Vesala (2005)   
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While establishing minimum prudential standards and providing for roughly comparable 
rules, substantial latitude on numerous dimensions for regulatory differences continues to exist. 
For example in the proposed implementation of Basle II, numerous national discretions exist in 
how Basle II will be applied.  
5 This raises concerns about incentives to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage on the part of the regulated institutions and in regulatory competition by country 
regulators.   
One logical implication of the home country approach is that over time, as the 
competitive climate increases and more and more cross-border banking evolves regulatory 
competition becomes more likely, which in turn should facilitate and drive Europe toward a truly 
single market environment.  To the extent that it does,  regulatory competition and the market 
place may serve as a lever in achieving the EU’s objective of a single market.  Individual country 
self interest in promoting their own institutions will also be an inducement to compete through 
deregulation of financial services. Countries offering more attractive charter options or 
accommodative regulatory regimes would expect to see domestically chartered institutions gain 
market share in the EU. The logical consequence of allowing home country regulation would, as 
the result of regulatory competition, be a less regulated and homogeneous market place.  
Mayes and Vesala (2005) argue that the sharing of responsibilities between home and 
host country regulators during the movement toward a single market objective is a viable policy  
precisely because  harmonization of regulation and supervisory policies  have taken place and  
official Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between and among the individual country 
                                                 
5 Regardless, of the form of entry, however, the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision (1997)) clearly indicates that supervision is to be “effective” within the EU, 
regardless of whether it is provided under the auspices of the home or host county   
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regulators have been put in place to share information.
6  However, others have argued, as will be 
seen in the next section, that such a structure is fraught with problems and conflicts that may 
erupt when significant intuitions experience financial difficulties.  Indeed, Mayes (2006) 
suggests it is just these concerns that have prompted the Nordic countries to layout specific 
responsibilities in the advance of the onset of a financial crisis, should the dominant institution in 
those countries – Nordia Bank – get into financial difficulties. 
Putting these issues aside for the moment, the EU regulatory structure anticipates the 
need for supervisory efforts to head off the insolvency of a “systemically important” bank.   
Should a institution experience financial difficulties requiring lender-of-last resort assistance in 
amounts greater than a given, but confidential, threshold, then approval is required by the 
Governing Council of the ECB.
7   While the ECB does not presently have formal lender of last 
resort authority, Gulde and Wolff (2005) suggest that there is a window of opportunity through 
the ECB’s payments system responsibilities to provide such funding.    
The EU regulatory system relies on common principles and coordinated approaches that 
would be followed when institutions experience financial difficulties.  Within this general 
framework, however, substantial differences exist in terms of the details of how the safety net is 
structured across countries as well in terms of the types of deposits and amounts that would be 
insured.  These differences contain substantial incentives for institutions to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage, and create important differences in how nations might respond should substantial 
institutions get into financial difficulty.  These will be detailed in the next sections.    
 
 
                                                 
6 Others argue vigorously that only a single regulator at the EU level like the ECB is situated for monetary policy 
will be effective (see Walter (2001), Di Giorio (2000)). 
7 See Gulde and Wolf (2005) for a review of the financial stability responsibilities in Europe.     
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III. Agency Problems and Conflicts 
Cross-border banking through foreign-owned branches or subsidiaries can subject the 
entering institutions to multiple regulatory jurisdictions and regulators, as well as to many 
different legal systems.  As a consequence, operating across borders presents potential problems 
for such banks beyond the fact that there are just more regulations to follow or regulators who 
may have different incentives.
8   Bank laws can differ greatly and may even be conflicting across 
the different countries.  Therefore, regulatory compliance may be uncertain and difficult for 
banking organizations with multiple country operations.  Furthermore, bank supervisors and 
regulators in both home and host countries typically operate in what they consider is the best 
interest of their country, however defined or perceived (Bollard, 2005).
9  This may lead to 
agency problem to the extent that the incentives of the regulators, deposit insurance provider 
and/or failure resolution entity are typically aligned with the residents of the regulators’ home or 
host country rather than with the interests of all customers in the whole market or geographic 
area within which the institution operates. 
Schüler (2003) points out that the incentive conflicts actually have two dimensions – a 
home country dimension and an international or cross-border dimension.   First, with respect to 
the home country issues, self interest and incentive problems of the classical principle/agent type 
exist between the banking supervisors and taxpayers.   Regulators have incentives to pursue 
policies that preserve their agencies.  In addition, they also to pursue their own private self-
                                                 
8 See Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2005) for a detailed discussion of these issues. 
9  This problem has arisen in France with the country’s attempt to preserve Credit Lyonnais with injections of 
governmental funds in more than three separate instances in the past several years.  More recently, an editorial in the 
Wall Street Journal Europe (2005) entitled “Spaghetti Banking” pointed out that the governor of the Bank of Italy 
had refused to approve the acquisition of a single Italian bank by a foreign institution for the last 12 years.  The 
governor indicate his desire to “… preserve the banks’ Italianness also in the future ….”  This protectionism was 
challenged by the European Union’s Internal Market Commission in connection with the proposed acquisitions of 
two Italian banks by ABN Amro and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentina, and the governor of the central bank was 
ultimately forced out amid criminal investigations associated with the blockage of the proposed transactions.   
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interest to ensure both their jobs and their future marketability and employment in the banking 
industry (see Kane (1991, 1989), Schüler (2003), and Lewis (1997)).   These conflicts may lead 
to more accommodating policies in the form of lower than appropriate capital requirements and 
to regulatory forbearance when institutions get in trouble, thereby shifting risk and any 
associated costs to taxpayers  as regulators attempt to ingratiate themselves with constituent 
banks. 
Second, with respect to cross-border banking, in areas such as the European Union, as 
foreign banking organizations begin to increase their market share and dominance through the 
establishment of branches (as distinct from expansion via subsidiaries) in the host country, host 
country regulators face a loss of constituents to supervise and regulate. As noted, EU policy, 
specifies that home country regulators are responsible for supervision and regulation of 
institutions chartered in their country regardless of the location of their braches.  At the same 
time, the host country is responsibility for financial stability within its boundaries..   One 
consequence of this structure is that individual country regulators have a country centric focus 
which may be manifested in several dimensions.  As noted, nationalistic concerns, may lead to a 
home country bias.   They may favor domestic over foreign institutions and attempt to limit the 
acquisitions of indigenous banks, or move to create “national” champions which would be 
protected from outside takeover.
10 Over time institutions with the more favorable home country 
regulatory environment will likely expand at the expense of those institutions with more 
stringent operating environments, especially when the restrictions impose costs rather than lead 
to healthier institutions.  Thus, different regulatory and supervisory regimes, whether de jure or 
defacto, create regulatory arbitrage opportunities. 
11 
                                                 
10  The French and Italian authorities have, in the past, attempted to limit acquisitions of their large institutions.  
11 Kane  (1977).    
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  Adding to the problem is that the quality of host country monitoring and supervision may 
be reduced with the entry by foreign branches or subsidiaries.  Both, host country regulators and 
the markets in these countries are generally less able to obtain useful financial information from 
foreign-owned institutions than they are from domestic domestically-owned banks (Committee 
on the Global Financial System, 2004).
12  This concern is especially acute for foreign branches 
which do not have meaningful balance sheets or income statements separate from the bank as a 
whole. This makes monitoring difficult for the host country regulator.  Such information is 
critical when foreign branches come to control a large share of the host country’s deposits, as is 
the case for many of the accession countries, because the host country is still responsible for 
financial stability and the lender of last resort function.  In the case of subsidiaries, since they are 
separate legal entities, they would have balance sheets and income statements that would be 
available to the regulator in the country in which they were chartered.  However, in the EU, 
because the home country is responsible for the consolidated supervision of the parent banking 
entity, the chartering agency for the subsidiary will still experience information problems to the 
extent that it may be unaware of, or have difficulty in obtaining information on, problems in 
other parts of the banking organization that may have implications for the viability of either the 
parent or its subsidiary.   
Schüler (2003) argues that this problem of  information access issue constitutes  a form 
of agency problem between the home and host country regulator.  The home country regulator, 
particularly if its monitoring and performance is weak, may be incented to disguise its poor 
performance by either producing disinformation on the performance of foreign branches or be 
less than diligent in supplying the host country regulator with timely information.  Without 
                                                 
12 Differences in quality can exist simply because countries fund their banking regulators differently or because they 
have had only limited experience in supervising market entities.   
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adequate and timely information, the host country may be in a poor position to assess the 
potential risks or externalities its citizens and economy may be exposed to from its foreign 
branches. These incentive conflicts may be especially acute in host countries with a large foreign 
banking presence.  This is an especially important issue in small economies where a foreign bank 
may be a significant player, but where those operations are relatively small compared to those in 
either its home country or elsewhere.  Many of the new EU entrants face this problem since they  
have a very large proportion of foreign banks, as Table 1 shows.   
The information problems are likely to become increasingly significant as banking 
organization expand and consolidate many of their management and record keeping functions to 
achieve cost efficiencies.  In the electronic age, institutions are increasingly being managed on a 
consolidated or integrated basis from the home country.  Niemeyer(2006) noted recently that “ 
…banks are progressively concentrating various functions, such as funding, liquidity 
management, risk management and credit decision-making, to specific centres of competence in 
order to reap the benefits of specialization and economies of scale.”  Furthermore, data and 
records are usually kept centrally at the home offices or at sites not necessarily in the host 
country.    Large complex banking organizations in particular are actively centralizing activities 
and either outsourcing or maintaining separate operating subsidiaries whose functions are to 
provide critical infrastructure or other  functions to their bank subsidiaries.
13    
The logistics and costs to host country regulators of quickly accessing information on 
these arrangements, or even finding it, can be daunting, even when the foreign banking 
organization enters by way of a bank subsidiary rather than a branch.  Should a foreign-owned 
institution become insolvent and be legally closed, it may not be possible to keep those portions 
                                                 
13 Schoenmaker and Oosterloo(2006) and Goodhart and Schoenmaker(2006) make similar observations about this 
centralization trend and include, in addition to functions mentioned above, internal controls treasury operations, 
compliance and auditing.     
 11
of the institution’s operations in the host country physically open and operating seamlessly 
during the resolution process in an attempt to limit any adverse consequences that may accrue to 
deposit and loan customers.  The necessary senior management, operating records, and computer 
facilities may be physically located in the home rather than in the host countries or in separately 
owned and operated affiliates and subsidiaries in third countries.  For these reasons, regulatory 
oversight and discipline is likely to be more difficult and less effective in host countries with a 
substantial foreign bank presence than in countries without this presence.  The resolution process 
is also less effective.  Perception of these problems is likely to heighten incentives on the part of 
host country regulators to seek to protect their own citizens, even at the expense of home country 
or other host country citizens.
14   
With respect to the international dimension to the agency problem, home country 
regulators may take insufficient account of how the externalities that a failure, and the way that it 
is resolved, may affect the host country. That is, because all the regulators in countries in which a 
banking organization operates may have different objective functions and incentives, they may 
not all be pulling in the same direction at the same time with respect to prudential supervision 
and regulation.  And these conflicts may be important, even when there exist coordinating bodies 
or agreements and understandings as to principles, such as in the European Union. As noted 
earlier, the home country is responsible for monitoring the performance of its chartered 
institutions, including the foreign branches of those institutions operating in other countries, but 
the host country is responsible for financial stability.
15   When a crisis arises, responsible parties 
                                                 
14 New Zealand addressed this problem by requiring subsidiaries to be structured in such a way that if the parent 
becomes insolvent, solvent subsidiaries can be operated effectively without interruption in terms of capabilities and 
management.  This may deny them the full benefits of economies of scale, scope and risk management.   
15 The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) recently raised the question “ How much responsibility home countries 
are willing to take for financial stability in other countries where a bank operates.  For example, the Nordea Group is 
a Swedish bank that has its largest market share in Finland.  Would the Swedish authorities be willing an able to 
judge Noreda’s impact on stability in Finland?  And would the Finnish authorities be prepared to transfer   
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may not have had a clear delineation ex ante of responsibilities between the home and host 
country nor anyway of enforcing those agreements that may have been made ex ante.  EU MOAs 
are merely agreements and lack enforceability under law.  Regulators may take conflicting 
actions to benefit their own country’s residents or institutions, say, with respect to the nature and 
timing of any sanctions imposed on a bank for poor performance, the timing of any official 
declaration of insolvency and the associated legal closing of the bank, the resolution of the 
insolvency, or the timing and amount of payment to insured and uninsured depositors.
16 
17   
We would expect that the incentives are for a host-country regulator to favor indigenous 
institutions and customers.  Hence the potential agency problems are likely to become more 
significant in markets and economic areas that are becoming increasingly integrated, as in the 
European Union, or that may be experiencing an influx of outside entry.  Indeed, the incentives 
may also vary depending upon simply the differing degree of cross border activities that may 
exist, as between the new and original members of the European Union. 
Until recently, cross-border banking has proceeded at a rather slow pace, especially 
within the EU, but as financial integration accelerates, more cross-border mergers are likely to 
take place, and many institutions will be bought by institutions from other countries.
18   To date, 
Table 1 shows that the degree of cross-border penetration within the EU rose at a modest pace 
from an average of 13% of banking assets in the 15 old member states in 1997 to only about 16% 
                                                                                                                                                             
responsibility for a considerable part of its financial system to Sweden?  Similar problems exist in other countries. 
“(Sveriges Riskbank (2003), pg. 2. 
16  A classic case of just such a decision occurred in the Herstadt Bank failure in which German authorities closed 
the institution at the end of the business day in Germany, but before all the bank’s foreign exchange transactions had 
settled with counter parties in other time zones.  While not affecting the total amount of loss, the timing of the legal 
closure did shift losses, either intentionally or not, from holders of mark claims on the bank, primarily  German 
depositors,  to those expecting to receive dollars from the bank, primarily US and UK banks later in the day.  
17 In the US, such conflicts have existed among state regulators and among federal banking regulators despite a 
national mandate to coordinate regulatory and supervisory policies and the existence of the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council.   
18  In New Zealand, for example, there are effectively no indigenous banks at all.     
 13
in 2004.   Penetration varied significantly from a high of  89% in 2004 for Luxembourg to a low 
of 5% for Germany.  The admission of 10 new countries changes the landscape, and potential 
cross-border issues significantly, since the degree of foreign penetration is much greater on 
average for the new members states.  Table 1 shows that foreign ownership in the accession 
countries averaged 58% of assets in 2004, with a high of 98% for Estonia and a low of 23% for 
Cyprus.   These countries are typically small in terms of GDP relative to the original EU 
countries (Table 2).  The largest of these new entrants is Poland, which accounts for only 4% of 
the EU’s GDP.  Of course, several of the older EU members are relatively small as well – seven 
have less than a 2% GDP share each.  Because of the relative importance of cross-border 
banking to the accession economies, and the relatively smaller size of their economies, compared 
to the rest of the EU, the potential externalities of the failure of large banks operating within 
these host countries could be very significant.   
  From the home country perspective, the incentives are not only to pay less attention to the 
externalities that failure may impose on host countries, but also to protect home country residents 
from possible costs of failure.  These incentives may be especially significant with respect to the 
provision of deposit insurance, which in the European case is primarily the responsibility of the 
home country.  These issues are considered in the next section. 
 
IV.  Deposit Insurance 
      In the European Union the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGD) (94/19/EC) 
provides the basic framework for the structure of how deposit insurance guarantees will be 
provided. The DGD endorsed a decentralized approach to deposit insurance, despite the fact that 
depository institutions are authorized to operate within any of the member countries.  The design 
leaves the responsibility of providing coverage to depositors and the particulars of the scheme   
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adopted at all branches domestically and foreign to the member home countries where a bank is 
chartered.   The DGD specifies the basic features that an acceptable deposit insurance should 
have.  Most specifically, the system should provide deposit insurance coverage of 20 thousand 
Euros, should exclude coverage of inter-bank deposits, and may exclude other liabilities at the 
discretion of the national government.  Co-insurance of liabilities is permitted but not required. 
Coverage of depositors in branches in countries other than the home country is the responsibility 
of the home country, but these can also be covered by the host country at its option.   
Additionally, should the host country account coverage be greater than that available to a branch 
thorough its home country deposit insurance scheme, the foreign branch may purchase top-off 
coverage to match that available to competing host country-chartered institutions.
19  There may 
be more than one scheme for different types of institutions. .But most terms of the deposit 
insurance structure are not prescribed, and the details of the schemes are left to the discretion of 
the individual member countries.
20  These include the funding of the plans, pricing of coverage, 
who should operate the plan (the private sector or public sector), how troubled institutions should 
be handled, what too-big-to-fail policies in terms of protecting de-jure uninsured claimants might 
or might not be pursued, or how conflicts would be resolved where two deposit insurance funds 
might be affected by failure of an institution with top up coverage (See Dale (2000) and Garcia 
and Nieto (2005) for descriptions of the existing arrangements in the EU).   
  Additionally, it is the responsibility of the home country’s central bank to serve as the 
lender of last resort.   However, little attention has been paid to how the responsible agencies 
decide whether a problem is a limited micro or broader systemic risk problem,  although the 
EU’s  Council of Economic and Financial Affairs, has recently promulgated a structure for 
                                                 
19  This also means that if home country insurance is superior in other features to that provided generally in the host 
country, then the branch would have a competitive advantage relative to institutions chartered in the host country. 
20 For a brief review see European Commission (2005) and European Parliament (1994).   
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coordination of financial stability efforts for banking supervisors and central banks within  the 
EU.  Banking supervisors have also embarked upon a series of crisis simulations to identify 
issues and problems that may arise.
21   
In establishing the minimal requirements for deposit insurance schemes, the attempt was 
obviously to balance the fact that most but not all original EU members already had deposit 
insurance plans in place and that many of the key provisions and features of there programs were 
different.  Presumably, the best that could be hoped for was that the schemes would be 
harmonized over time. The potential for cross-boarder problems, at least in the short-run, 
appeared minimal because there were few truly multinational institutions in the EU. The plans 
that were put in place by individual countries in order to comply with the DGD varied 
substantially from those already in place. Finally, responsibility for supervision and risk 
monitoring is apportioned differently across the system and within the different countries.   
Whatever the differences, it was not intended that institutional detail and plan features 
would serve as a source of competitive advantage within host or home countries.  However, 
Huizinga and Nicodeme (2002) demonstrate that within the guidelines established by the EU, the 
discretionary differences in insurance system design have affected international depositor 
decisions as to the placement of their funds.  In particular, countries with schemes with low 
premiums, co-insurance and private administration are more attractive to international 
depositors.  But more relevant to this study, they also suggest that “… countries can in principle 
tailor their deposit insurance systems to allow their banks to capture a larger market share in the 
                                                 
21 Neito and Penalosa  (2004) describe the proposed structure in great detail and discuss recent efforts to deal with 
the problems of coordination.   
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international deposit market.  This could lead to international regulatory competition in the area 
of deposit insurance policies.”
22 
Hence it is reasonable to be concerned that the structure of these systems, including their 
financing and the way that claims will be settled create agency problems between host and home 
country citizens and the management of deposit guarantee schemes that may significantly impact 
the efficiency of resolving insolvent banks at minimum cost to the host country.   Going forward 
the patchwork set of deposit insurance schemes, when coupled with the bifurcated approach to 
controlling systemic risk, seems fraught with the potential for agency and conflicts of interest 
problems (see Kane (2003b)). These arise from several sources including:  
1.  Uncertainties about the funding of the deposit insurance plans,  
2.  Differences in deposit insurance coverage and pricing of coverage,  
3.   Reliance upon the home country, as opposed to the host country, should institutions 
get into financial difficulties,  
4.  Differences in treatment with respect to the lender-of-last-resort function,  
5.  Differences in approaches to bankruptcy resolution and priority of claims in troubled 
institutions and  
6.  Differences in EMU vs non-EMU participants 
EU countries must establish policies for how foreign banks operating in the country will 
be treated.  In addition, EU directives require that host country chartered or licensed subsidiary 
banks of foreign parents receive treatment equal to that accorded chartered domestic banks in the 
country.  But Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2005) suggest that it may not be appropriate to provide 
the same treatment for branch offices of foreign banks as for subsidiaries. especially when top-
                                                 
22 Huizinga and Nicodeme (2002), pg. 15.   
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off insurance is provided or the branches themselves are also insured in the host country.
23  Host 
country monitoring, for reasons discussed earlier, is not likely to be as effective as home country 
monitoring, because less meaningful financial reporting information from domestic branches of 
foreign banks is available.  Even if information from the home country about the entire legal 
entity were available, host countries are unlikely to be able to take actions against any banks 
outside their own jurisdiction.  Finally, the potential losses to uninsured creditors and to the 
deposit guarantee fund depend as much upon the home country closure and resolution policies as 
on the financial condition of the institution.   
The more insolvent an institution is before it is legally closed, the greater are the losses to 
the insurance funds and possibly taxpayers.  For this reason, host countries may become more 
reluctant to provide insurance for foreign branches.  Despite this, several EU countries not only 
have either an insurance option for EU and/or branches of institutions chartered in non-EU 
member countries but also offer topping off options when the home country deposit guarantee 
plan is less than in the host country.  This exposes host country insurance funds to “regulatory 
risk” because the closure decision and any losses to the host country insurance fund depend upon 
actions of the home country regulator.   
Table 3 suggests that while there are some differences across EU countries in their 
insurance treatment of foreign branches and deposits, most countries do enable foreign branches 
to elect to be insured by their deposit insurance funds, and some provide insurance of foreign 
deposits as well, with most, but not all, being limited to foreign currency deposits of other EU 
member countries.  Some countries also permit foreign operated branches to purchase additional 
insurance, when insured in their home country, if the host country’s insurance scheme is more 
                                                 
23 Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2005) discuss in detail differences in the implications of entry by branches as opposed 
through establishing subsidiaries   
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generous.  Table 4 details the differences that exist in insurance coverage across the Euro area.  
Several countries, including France, Italy and Germany, are substantially more generous in their 
coverage than the minimum coverage of 20 thousand EURO,   Tables 5 & 6 also suggest that 
many of the attributes that Huizinga and Nicodeme (2002) found to be important to international 
depositors, such as private administration and co-insurance, do vary substantially across EU 
countries.   
    Table 7 shows that there are substantial differences not only in the legal requirements 
for when depositors are to be paid but also when they have actually been paid.
24 
25  But even if 
the countries use the same currency, e.g., Euros by Euroland countries, if taxpayers in the home 
country are required to fund some or all of the insurance, they may be reluctant to make 
payments to depositors in foreign countries.  Despite EU directives which require universality in 
the treatment of all EU citizens, the Sveriges Riksbank (2003, p.87) noted recently that: 
 
 … if a cross-border [branch bank] were to fail, it is improbable that either politicians or 
authorities in the respective countries would be willing to risk taxpayers’ money to 
guarantee stability in countries other than their own.  This could prompt the concerned 
countries to try to ring-fence the bank’s assets in their own country with a view to 
minimizing the costs to the domestic economy, or not to intervene at all in the hope that 
other countries in which the bank has a bigger presence feel forced to act. The result 
could be a suboptimal resolution of the crisis that proves more costly or that produces 
greater adverse effects for all the countries involved.   
 
  When a large number of foreign branches from different home countries coexist in a host 
country, bank customers in that country may encounter a wide variety of different insurance 
plans.   These plans are likely to differ, at times significantly, in terms of account coverage, 
premiums, insurance agency ownership (private vs. government) and operation, ex ante funding 
                                                 
24 Because many countries permit several extensions of the payment deadlines, this probably explains the difference 
between the legal payout requirements and actual performance. 
25  Within the European Union, of course, there are countries that have the Euro but others that aren’t part of the 
European Monetary Union and have their own currencies.   
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and credibility.
26  Table 8 provides a general tabulation of the kinds of differences that can and 
do exist within the EU, despite the attempts to ensure uniformity.  At the same time, host country 
regulators encounter banks operating under a wide array of different foreign banks and different 
rules and regulations. 
  If the home country provides the insurance and pays the losses in branches operating in 
other countries, it is likely to demand at least some prudential regulatory jurisdiction over the 
activities of those branches in host countries, regardless of what may or may not be permitted in 
the host country.  If this authority is exercised, this may imply different regulatory regimes with 
different sanction schedules coexisting for a branch in a host country.  Moreover, if a branch has 
toping-up insurance, then depositors of the branch will face potentially different rules and 
availabitly for those portions of their deposits covered by the home country deposit guarantee 
scheme than for those deposits covered by the host country scheme.   In the EU, many but not all 
members require or permit topping off.  But even here, provisions differ.  Some countries, such 
as Malta only cover the difference between coverage provided in the home country, while others 
provide duplicate insurance.   
The situation becomes more complex and confusing as the number of countries with 
banks operating branches in a host country increases.  Host countries may face quite different 
situations if home country A bank failed versus home country B bank.   
 
V. Insolvency Resolution 
As financial integration proceeds, and in particular as cross border-bank expansion 
increases, even what may appear to be small differences between schemes may be magnified.  
Equally important, differences in the guarantee arrangements may generate significant cost 
                                                 
26 Many of the specific differences have already been detailed in Tables 3-6.   
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shifting when a troubled institution needs to be closed or resolved.   There are generally two 
different models for dealing with banking insolvency, and these hinge generally on the special 
role that deposit insurance and banking supervisors play and the supervisor’s ability to intervene 
in a bank’s activities before failure occurs.  In the US, special bankruptcy laws apply, whereas in 
Europe, the general bankruptcy statutes apply.  The EC Directive 2001/24/EC of April 4, sets 
forth EU policy for how failed banks (credit institutions) are to be resolved.
27  The intent is to 
create a common approach to insolvency resolution.  It leaves the actual closure decision to each 
home country, and its applicable bankruptcy procedures, but attempts to promote equal treatment 
for creditors, regardless of where they are located.  Harmony is to be achieved through mutual 
recognition of both home and host country bankruptcy procedures and coordination among 
authorities.  Krimminger1(2004) indicates that conflicts are supposed to be resolved through a 
mediation process that conveys that responsibility to the home country.   As for differences in 
treatment of financial institutions, Hupkis (2003) indicates that in most countries in the EU bank 
insolvencies are covered under the general bankruptcy statutes, but several countries provide 
exceptions. Some authorize the banking supervisory agency the right to petition for bankruptcy.  
A few EU countries have separate bankruptcy statutes for banks.  
A number of questions arise concerning cross-border insolvencies.  Because both the 
timing of the official declaration of insolvency and the process by which an insolvency is 
resolved have important effects on the host country of a branch or subsidiary, should the host 
country share in the prudential regulation with the home country and, if so, in what way?  In the 
EU, the home country is responsible for a foreign branch but the host country is responsible for 
any subsidiaries chartered therein. 
                                                 
27 Krimminger1 (2004)   
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How far can and does inter-country regulatory cooperation go? Inter-country cooperation 
tends to operate best when things are going well but deteriorates rapidly as conditions in the 
countries involved deteriorate and generate conflicts arising from an incentive for a home 
country regulator to give preference to its own citizens even at the expense of host country 
residents or other host country citizens.   In the EU, substantial efforts have been devoted to 
cooperative arrangements and understandings about information sharing.  In addition, crisis 
simulations have been undertaken and memoranda of understandings have been struck in many 
instances.  However, cooperation works best when there is no crisis, nor do simulations involve 
the same cost-benefit calculations that real crises entail.   
Does it matter whether the absolute or relative size of the branches or subsidiary are 
much larger in the host country than in the home country?  Would home countries be more or 
less likely to declare a bank insolvent sooner or later given that this decision may impact the 
home and host countries differently?  Would host countries permit home countries, whose branch 
banks comprise a large percentage of the banking assets in that country, to be the final 
determiner of the insolvency decision or “pull the plug” on their banks in the host countries when 
the host country has to suffer any excess damage from either overly hasty or overly slow action?  
In the EU, systemic risk resolution is the responsibility of the local supervisory agencies and 
central banks.  However, in the case of use of the lender of last resort function, large transactions 
(at present unspecified or at least not publicly available) must be approved by the Governing 
Council of the European Central Bank.  The specifics, however, of the home country treatment 
of banks whose failure might present systemically important implications for a host country are 
not explicitly addressed in EU directives.  Indeed, it is for this very reason, that Nordic countries   
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have structured their own arrangements specifically designed to deal with Nordea bank, should it 
experience financial difficulties. 
Should countries be able to impose depositor preferences in favor of deposits at their own 
home office relative to deposits at foreign host offices, as the United States and Australia do? In 
Europe, EU directives specifically require that EU citizens and claims be treated equally in the 
event of a bank failure.   
Accounting rules are also likely to differ among countries.  Thus, the timing of when 
accounting insolvency occurs is likely to differ in different countries.  Solvency in one country 
may be recorded as insolvency in another and vice-versa. This alone, even if the regulators in 
different countries move to resolve official insolvencies at the same speed, will result in different 
timing of resolutions.  Accounting for profitability is also likely to differ among countries.  This 
is likely to result in the transfer of activities within a banking organization and across 
subsidiaries to countries where the activity receives the most favorable accounting treatment 
(Cardenas, 2003).  To the extent that such shifts may not only interfere with the efficient 
allocation of resources in the host country branches, but also adversely affect the financial 
condition of subsidiaries in particular countries, they are of concern to the prudential regulators 
in those countries.  Some analysts have argued that requiring foreign bank subsidiaries to have 
equity outstanding and minority (independent) directors may lessen the likelihood of shifts that 
impact the host country adversely, in addition to providing additional signals about significant 
changes in the financial health of the subsidiary or organization as a whole.  Despite these 
concerns, the fact that all EU firms must abide by the International Financial Reporting 
Standards should serve to at least constrain countries from applying different valuation 
procedures to some degree.   
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  The effectiveness of home country prudential regulation of its foreign branches and 
subsidiaries in most countries depends on a number of factors, including the strength and 
credibility of the home country’s deposit insurance scheme and the relative and absolute sizes of 
the banks in each country (Mayes, 2004 and Eisenbeis 2004).  Host countries would prefer home 
country prudential regulation of foreign branches particularly when the home country deposit 
insurance scheme is strong and host country branches are large.  Home country regulation is least 
satisfactory to host countries when its deposit insurance scheme is weak and branches in the host 
country large. 
  As earlier noted, for subsidiary banks in financial difficulties, host country regulators 
need to be concerned whether the parent will or will not rescue the sub, and for solvent 
subsidiary banks of troubled foreign parents, whether or not the parent will attempt to strip assets 
from the sub, whether the sub’s solvency is threatened through reputation risk from the parent’s 
insolvency or whether the parent could continue to supply important services.
28  The table 9 
suggests that the severity of the agency problems are dependent on a number of factors, 
including the absolute and relative sizes of the parent and subsidiary and of the countries 
involved.  Some host countries require capital maintenance agreements between the parent and it 
foreign subsidiary banks’ regulators requiring parental support if the sub gets into financial 
trouble. But enforcement of such provisions across borders can be difficult. The greatest chance 
of parents walking away from insolvent subsidiaries is when the parent is small and solvent and 
the sub is insolvent regardless of size.  The least chance is when the parent is large and solvent 
and the sub is insolvent, again regardless of size.  Size matters most when the parent is solvent.  
Small parents are less likely to rescue insolvent foreign subs of any size. 
                                                 
28  A similar matrix is developed in Goodhart (2005).  A more detailed analysis of the decision to expand cross-
border through branches or subsidiaries appears in Dermine(2006) and Eisenbeis and Kaufman(2005b). .   
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  EU member countries have different structures for deposit insurance as well as for 
financial institution supervision and regulation.  Some have split supervision and regulation 
according to function while others have consolidated supervision and regulation into a single 
agency.  In some instances, the central bank is involved in prudential regulation and in other 
countries it is not. One implication of the different structures is that policy tradeoffs for 
regulatory agencies faced with the same set of policy issues may differ.  This both sets up many 
opportunities for individual institutions to pit the countries’ agencies against each other and  
fosters regulatory arbitrage on the part of financial institutions to seek a competitive advantage.
29   
However, relying upon regulatory competition to level the playing field also risks 
creating a more lax supervisory system and may open the system up to unintended systemic 
problems should major financial institutions get into financial difficulty,  To be sure, the EU has 
set minimum supervisory standards for the region through directives and agreements in order 
both to set a lower bound as far as safety and soundness risks are concerned and to promote 
cooperation and information sharing among the individual country supervisors.
30  While these 
directives and guidelines are an attempt to limit excessive regulatory competition, except at the 
margin, there is no EU-wide bank supervisor or other agency responsible for providing Euro-
wide deposit insurance or for resolving the failure after declaring an institution insolvent and 
(establishing and enforcing a common closure rule).   This is a major weakness of the current 
                                                 
29 Kremers, Schoenmaker and Wierts (2003) recognize the importance of the existence of certain of these conflicts 
involving systemic supervision (the lender-of-last resort) and prudential supervision in comparing the supervisory 
structure adopted in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  
 
30 One of the more important of these directives sets policy towards capital adequacy through the Capital Adequacy 
Directive, which led to the Basel I capital standards for EU supervisors to follow. Basel I has now been refined by 
the Basel Bank Supervisors Committee now known as Basel II. Unfortunately, concentration of supervisory efforts 
on capital standards substitutes supervisory judgment for market-based risk weights to determine if an institution has 
sufficient capital. Wall and Eisenbeis (2002) argue that this focus is misplaced and misdirects supervisory attention 
from prompt corrective action and least cost resolution of troubled institution.  
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design. It results in one that may seemingly work well during good times, but, as noted earlier, is 
filled with risks, conflicts, and potential delays in resolving problems in bad times.  Indeed, these 
risks are likely to prove more significant over time, as the EU financial system becomes more 
integrated and more countries with different economic and financial systems at different stages 
of development join.  That is, one of the biggest threat to lasting EU financial stability hinges 
upon the design of deposit insurance systems within the EU countries and the structure of 
bankruptcy resolution in the event that institutions get into financial difficulties. 
 
VI.  Deposit Insurance Payout Coordination Problems for the EU 
  Numerous practical issues arise if a large cross-border institution should experience 
financial difficulties and have to be legally closed and resolved.   Cross border coordination and 
decision making would be extremely difficult, especially in the absence of explicit ex ante 
plans.
31  Consider an extreme case in which a cross-border institution operated both branches and 
separately chartered subsidiaries in each of the current 25 EU countries.  In this case there would 
be 24 home country regulators (one for the parent institution and each of the separately chartered 
subsidiaries), 24 different deposit insurance funds (with primary responsibility for the home 
chartered subsidiaries but with overlapping responsibilities for branches in each host country and 
foreign branches in their own country to the extent that the institution might have chosen to top 
out its coverage), and 24 separate central banks possibly involved if emergency liquidity had to 
be provided to keep the institution operating while claims against it were resolved.  In the 
extreme, there could be 72 separate entities that would have a role is some part of the resolution 
of this institution.   
                                                 
31 The European Commission is engaged in a review of its Deposit Insurance Directive 94/19 and surveys are still 
being conduced to provide an up to data compendium of the exact provisions of each country’s scheme.   
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With different deposit insurance coverage, sorting out who would be responsible for what 
claims would be a daunting task, especially when it comes to the top off coverage claims for 
cross-border branches.   In addition, because of different laws governing claims in bankruptcy 
across the different countries, there would be the added complication that depositors’ claims 
might be treated differently if held in a branch than a subsidiary.  Imagine the difficulty for a 
depositor, especially a corporate customer, who might have multiple accounts across countries,   
in choosing an account in his/her own country among say branches of banks headquartered in 23 
other countries with different insurance and resolution systems.  Any claims might be settled 
differently depending upon which bank or country the account was held and whether the account 
was in a branch or subsidiary.  Imagine also depositors in a member country with branches of 
banks chartered, say, in all of the other 24 countries.  The depositors would be faced with options 
involving 25 deposit insurance schemes and 25 insolvency resolution schemes. To make the 
guarantee system work smoothly, there would have to be no risk that one or more country 
deposit insurance funds might default or might not be able or unwilling to meet its obligations, 
particularly when many of the deposits of the insolvent bank are at branches in host countries  
While this may, in good times, be viewed by the responsible authorities as an unlikely event, 
there is ample evidence  that commitments are not always kept in bad times (see Appendix I for a 
discussion of the failures of US sponsored nonfederal government deposit insurance systems).  
For this reason, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2006) argue for the establishment of explicit ex 
ante commitments to share the burden should losses occur.  
 
 
VII. Possible Solutions to the Deposit Insurance Problems and Difficulties in Resolving 
Problems in Foreign-Owned Banks.   
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It is well understood that poorly designed deposit insurance, safety nets and regulatory 
structures encourage both moral hazard behavior by banks and poor bank regulator performance 
in resolving troubled banks can lead to excess forbearance on problem institutions. These effects 
increase both the likelihood and costs of a banking crisis.    
 In the EU, there is little uniformity in the underlying legal structure for resolving bank 
failures. Only a few regulators have legal closure authority, and failure resolution is covered 
under general bankruptcy laws.  This is in stark contract to  the U.S., for example, where there is 
a separate bankruptcy and administrative process for banking mergers administered by the FDIC.  
  Part of the difficulties with efficient resolution of foreign-owned bank insolvencies lie in 
the heterogeneity of both the closure rule and the deposit insurance structure across countries.  
These difficulties include: differences in both provisions and enforcement; overlapping of 
legislation, regulation, and supervision between home and host countries; and inherent incentives 
for regulators to favor the welfare of their home countries, possibly at the expense of the host 
country.  These problems are complex and do not lead to easy or simple lasting solutions. 
Moreover, they become increasingly significant as more and more banks operate banking offices 
in foreign countries.    
Coordination and cooperation among home and host countries, which has become the 
focal point for European efforts to deal with troubled institutions is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to solve the problem.
32  What appears to be required is greater harmonization and 
homogeneity, particularly in closure policies and claims resolution and most likely eventual EU-
wide deposit insurance and bankruptcy laws and resolution agencies  Indeed, centralized 
multinational regimes for deposit insurance and insolvency declaration (closure rule) and 
                                                 
32  This issue has also been addressed by Denmark’s Nationalbank (2005).   
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resolution, in terms of both provisions and enforcement, appear to be the most promising way to 
ensure that bank failures are resolved efficiently and without creating undue uncertainty.
33  This 
would eliminate the differences that make multiple individual home-host country regulatory 
regimes and cross-border enforcement a severe problem.  But such a system raises numerous 
questions.  Which countries should be include in the arrangement, how to deal with those 
excluded, how to organize the governing board, how are countries represented on the board, 
what authority and enforcement power would such a board have, what funding would be 
available, especially given the lack of a fiscal taxing authority at the pan-European level. and 
whether the conflicts discussed above are eliminated by a single structure or primarily only 
internalized and hidden from view?  These issues are significant enough that it is unlikely that a 
single, multinational structure for either deposit insurance or insolvency resolution could be 
adopted in the near future. We put forward a four point program for efficiently resolving 
insolvent banks so that both their credit losses and the widespread fear of bank failures are 
minimized and the adverse moral hazard incentives inherent in deposit insurance become benign. 
Indeed, with efficient insolvency resolution, deposit insurance provides desirable built-in 
redundancy in case specific resolutions turn out ex-post not to be effective, much like airplanes 
that have two or even three brake systems in case the first system fails.  But this is a second best 
solution. The preferred solution is to prevent the occurrence of  bank insolvencies through 
effective market discipline and appropriate regulatory prompt corrective actions.   
  The proposal is  based on a fundamental understanding of the nature of bank failures and 
where their costs occur.  Banks become economically insolvent when the market value of their 
assets declines below the value of their deposits and other debt funding so that the value of their 
capital turns negative.  At this point, a bank cannot pay out all its debts, including deposits in full 
                                                 
33 Kane (2005) considers another alternative which involves the sale of options on insolvency losses.   
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and on time, and the depositors and other creditors share in the losses according to their legal 
priority. 
  These claimants may experience both credit and liquidity losses in the resolution process. 
Credit losses may occur when the recovery value of the bank as a whole or in parts falls short of 
the par value of its deposits or other debt on the respective due dates.  Liquidity losses may occur 
for two reasons.  First, depositors may not have immediate (next business day or so) and full 
access to the par value of their insured claims or to the estimated recovery value of their de jure 
uninsured claims.  In the case of insured deposits, the insurer must have a fund to provide  
eligible depositors with immediate and full access before the insurer may collect the proceeds 
from  the sale of  the bank or its underlying assets and, in case of losses, to fill the difference 
between the par value and the recovery value.  In the case of uninsured claims, liquidity can be 
provided either by a direct injection of funds or thought a liquid and active secondary market for 
receivership certificates given to uninsured claimants by the insurance agency,   Second, 
qualified borrowers may not be able to utilize their existing credit lines immediately.  Insolvent 
banks may be said to be resolved efficiently with least cost to society when the sum of aggregate 
credit losses and aggregate liquidity losses, or total losses, are at or close to zero. 
  Insolvent banks in a country may be resolved efficiently if the process employed by bank 
regulators in the country in which a bank is chartered or licensed can satisfy the following four 
rules or principles.
34  Each principle focuses importantly on the term “prompt:” 
  1.  Prompt legal closure when the bank’s equity capital declines to some pre-
specified and well-publicized positive minimum greater than zero (legal closure 
rule), 
                                                 
34  See Kaufman (2004a).  Similar plans have been proposed by Mayes (2005) and the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand (Harrison, 2005), among others.   
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  2.  Prompt estimate of the recovery values and assignment of credit losses 
(“haircuts”) to de jure uninsured bank claimants when equity is negative to avoid 
protecting de-jure uninsured claimants, 
  3.  Prompt reopening (e.g., next workday), particularly of larger banks, with full 
depositor access to their accounts on their due dates at their insured or estimated 
recovery values and full borrower access to their pre-established credit lines, and 
  4.  Prompt re-privatization in whole or in parts with adequate capital.  
 
Adoption of these four principles and the necessary infrastructure to make them work, 
would largely eliminate most of the agency problems, negative externalities, insurance fund 
losses, and coordination problems associated with the current EU system that has been identified 
here and by others as well.    
  The next sub sections review how each principle is or could be satisfied in bank 
insolvencies in the United States.  We argue that, while not without flaws and not focused on 
foreign-owned banks, the current system in the U.S. may serve as a useful model for other 
countries in designing their insolvency resolution policies.  The U.S. system was developed 
largely in response to the widespread and costly bank and thrift institution insolvencies of the 
1980s. 
A.  Prompt Legal Closure 
  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 
introduced a bright line bank closure rule that is triggered when the ratio of book value tangible 
equity capital to total on-balance sheet assets declines to a minimum of 2 percent.
35  If not 
                                                 
35 Banks and thrift institutions in the U.S. are not subject to the corporate bankruptcy code but to a special code in 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA).  The bank act is considerably more administrative and less judicial, 
considerably more creditor friendly, and potentially faster in the declaration of insolvency ousting the shareholders   
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corrected within 90 days, the bank must be declared legally insolvent, closed by the appropriate 
federal or state regulator, and placed in receivership or conservatorship.
36   Its charter is revoked. 
Shareholder controlling interests are terminated and senior management is changed.  If the 
institution can be successfully resolved before its market value capital declines below zero, 
losses are confined to shareholders.  Depositors and other creditors are fully protected and kept 
whole, and deposit insurance is effectively redundant.  Thus, any adverse spillover effects, which 
occur primarily when capital turns negative and losses are imposed on counterparties, are 
minimized.   
  Because the closure rule is specified in terms of book value capital rather than the market 
value of capital, there is no guarantee that the institution will be resolved before its economic 
capital is depleted or that creditors will be fully protected against losses.  As a bank approaches 
insolvency, book values tend to increasingly overstate market values for assets.   Thus, there is a 
risk that use of the book value closure rule may result in de facto forbearance.
37 
38  Nevertheless, 
specifying a closure rule based on a capital ratio that is greater than zero provides some 
protection against losses due to the deviation of book from market value and losses due to errors 
in measuring asset values. 
  Legal closure according to a well specified, publicized, and credibly enforced closure 
rule has several desirable attributes. There are no surprises. All players know the rules in 
advance and base their actions accordingly.  It treats all depositors and other creditors in the 
same priority class more fairly.  Because banks tend to have a larger percentage of demand 
                                                                                                                                                             
and in-place senior management, and payments to creditors.  Bank and financial holding companies are, however, 
subject to the general corporate bankruptcy code (Bliss and Kaufman, 2006).  
36  Two 90 day extensions are permitted.   
37 While regulators in the U.S. may also declare a bank insolvent for a number of other reasons, such as unsafe and 
unsound banking, they must do so when the at the closure rule capital ratio is breached.   
38 Wall and Eisenbeis (2002) demonstrate that, on average, institutions in the U.S. have been legally closed long 
after the market value of equity became negative.    
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deposits and other short-term deposits and debt than other firms, bad news, impending 
insolvency, or uncertainty about how creditors would be treated in the event of insolvency 
typically increase the incentives of those who can withdraw their funds to do so while there are 
still assets available to satisfy their claims.  Uncertainty thus raises the probability of a run, with 
the initial runners receiving full payment and those unable, or unwilling to run, receiving less. 
However, the presence of a strong perception of an enforced closure rule at positive capital 
would greatly reduce the incentive to run.  All debt claimants, regardless of the date of maturity 
of their claims, would know that they would not suffer credit losses.  Reducing the incentive for 
runs also increases the time regulators have to act to deter insolvency or bring about an efficient 
resolution if the closure trigger is breached.  At the same time, equity holders would have greater 
incentive to attempt to address problems promptly as capital ratios declined, since they would 
know with greater certainty that they would stand to lose their claims.  They would have little 
incentive to engage in excessive risk taking or moral hazard behavior. 
  Banks become insolvent in the U.S. and need to be legally closed because another 
provision of FDICIA – prompt corrective action (PCA) – has failed to incent financially troubled 
banks to turn around before insolvency.  PCA established a series of five capital tranches ranging 
down from “well-capitalized” to “critically under-capitalized.”  Progressively harsher and more 
mandatory sanctions are applied by the bank regulators on weak financial institutions as their net 
worth declines through these tranches to discourage their insolvency (Table 10 ).  The sanctions 
are similar to those that the market imposes on firms in non-regulated industries.  Sanctions 
include change in senior management, reductions in dividends, restrictions on growth and 
acquisitions, adoption of capital restorations plans and, if the bank is a subsidiary of a financial 
holding company, loss of its parent’s status as a financial holding company with the associated   
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wider range of powers.
39  The tranches effectively serve as “speed bumps” to slow a bank’s 
deterioration and to force regulators to become more involved with troubled banks well before 
insolvency, so that they may be ready to close them legally when necessary and not be caught by 
surprise and delayed.  Thus, PCA effectively “buys time” for the regulators to act efficiently.  
PCA also grants regulators some discretion to apply appropriate sanctions and actions as a 
bank’s capital position deteriorates depending upon the individual circumstances to turn the bank 
around to profitability.  This is in contrast to the supervisory actions employed prior to FDICIA 
when intervention was less frequent and discretion was often focused on ways to keep 
institutions operating after they had become economically insolvent without forcing 
improvements.  This latter policy tended to result in losses to both uninsured creditors and the 
FDIC.     
  While PCA has not prevented all bank failures, it has contributed significantly to turning 
troubled banks around before insolvency and reducing both the number and the aggregate cost of 
failures.
40  However, it is important to note that PCA and a closure rule at positive capital are not 
intended to prevent all failures.   As in other industries, inefficient and/or unlucky banks should 
be permitted to fail and inept management replaced.  But, because the adverse externalities of 
bank insolvencies are widely perceived to be substantially greater than for other firms, such 
failures should occur only at low cost with minimal losses to creditors. 
 
  B.  Prompt Estimate and Allocation of Credit Losses 
  Because the regulators should be scrutinizing troubled banks under PCA well before they 
approach the capital ratio closure trigger, the recovery value of the institution as a whole or in 
                                                 
39 (Price-Waterhouse Coopers, 2003) 
40  See OCC (2003) and FDIC Salmon et al.(2003).    Kaufman (2004d) and Wall and Eisenbeis (2002) both suggest, 
however, that losses in individual cases have been significant.     
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parts should be able to be estimated quickly upon legal closure for most banks.  If the present 
value of the estimated recovery value falls short of the par value of the deposits and other debts, 
pro rata losses (haircuts) should be allocated to these claimants in their order of legal priority to 
avoid protecting de-jure uninsured claimants.  In the US, the FDIC has equal standing with 
depositors at domestic offices and higher standing than other depositors and creditors.
 41   The 
FDIC stands in the shoes of the insured depositors at domestic offices and is obligated to make 
them whole.  It also shares proportionally in any losses with uninsured depositors at these offices 
beyond the losses charged first to other creditors and deposits at foreign offices.  FDICIA 
requires the FDIC to share any losses in the insolvency with uninsured claimants and resolve the 
institution at least cost to the insurance fund.  The only exception is when doing so is likely to 
“have serious adverse effects on economic conditions and financial stability,” the so-called 
“systemic risk exemption” or successor to “too-big-to-fail.”  Requiring parties besides the FDIC 
to share in any losses is necessary to minimize moral hazard excessive risk-taking behavior by 
banks and to enhance market discipline by reinforcing the ex post at-risk nature of de jure at-risk 
claimants.  This should, in turn, reduce the number or bank failures. 
  C.  Prompt Reopening of Large Banks 
  Liquidity losses to depositors can occur through delayed access to or freezing of deposit 
accounts.  This process in effect transforms demand deposits and short-term time deposits 
involuntarily into longer-term time deposits or even  bonds.  Liquidity losses also result when 
credit lines cannot be relied upon or drawn down by borrowers to meet business needs.  When 
regulators close a bank legally they often also effectively close it physically, at least partially, 
until funds are recovered from the sale of assets to start paying depositors on their claims.  In 
                                                 
41  Under the Depositor Preference Act of 1993, claims of general bank creditors, including sellers of Fed funds, and 
deposits at foreign offices are subordinated to deposits at domestic offices.  See Kaufman (1997) and Marino and 
Bennett (1999)   
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many countries the lack of access to deposits and credit lines is more feared than credit losses to 
depositors and generates  as great, if not greater, adverse externalities.  The inability to use 
deposits to make immediate payments greatly reduces the efficiency of the payments system. 
Additionally, the more likely depositors are to have access to their funds promptly, the less likely 
they are to engage in runs. 
  Regulators often are unable or unwilling to avoid, at least briefly, closing banks 
physically when they close them legally, e.g., because of insufficient information on depositors 
or recovery values or insufficient funds to advance payments.  In some countries, both insured 
and uninsured depositors first need to file claims with the deposit insurance agency after 
notification in order to attain access to their funds. In others, it is left to depositors to monitor 
newspapers and file claims.  This is a time consuming and costly process during which the funds 
are effectively frozen. Thus, there is considerable pressure on regulators to avoid legally closing 
banks promptly.  By delaying legal closure, the regulators not only avoid liquidity losses.  But 
delay also postpones, at least temporarily, explicitly recognizing underlying implicit credit losses 
and provides additional time in which the bank may try to regain solvency and thereby avoid 
altogether the unpleasant task of legal closure.  But evidence in many countries strongly suggests 
that, on average, such forbearance increases the costs in the long-run over what they would have 
been had the insolvent institution been legally closed promptly.  To reduce the incentive for 
regulators to forbear, FDICIA made prompt legal closure mandatory and to increase the 
efficiency of the resolution required it be at least cost to the FDIC.   
  Liquidity losses may be minimized or eliminated entirely by legally reopening the 
insolvent bank the next business day with full access to all accounts.  This would provide insured 
depositors near immediate and seamless access to the par value of their accounts, uninsured   
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depositors and other general creditors to the estimated recovery value of their accounts on due 
dates, and borrowers to their credit lines.
42  Thus, legal closure is separated from physical 
closure.     
  Potential payments to depositors and other debt claimants, either directly or through 
assumption of these claims by another bank, requires an immediate sale of the bank by the FDIC 
or access to a source of funds either its own or through a pre-designated source of borrowing.  
The FDIC may also operate the bank temporarily through a newly chartered bridge bank that 
assumes most or all of the assets and liabilities of the failed bank, generally at market values.    
The bridge bank is either capitalized with equity by the FDIC or its deposits are fully guaranteed 
by the FDIC during its operation until it is reprivatized.  The bridge bank provides the FDIC with 
additional time to find qualified private buyers for the bank and wind-down its operations 
efficiently. 
  It should be noted that minimizing liquidity losses is not a traditional deposit insurance 
function, which is to protect targeted depositors against credit losses, Less attention has been 
paid to the problem of the timing of  when depositors gain access to their funds. This depends 
both on when the insurance agency receives the proceeds from the sale of the bank as a whole or 
in parts and whether the agency has access to a fund or borrowing facilities to make advance 
payments to the depositors of both the estimated recovery amount and for insured depositors also 
of the amount necessary to make them whole. 
  In the U.S., the FDIC usually pays insured deposits at the failed bank at par the next 
business day even though it may not yet have collected from the sale of the insolvent bank’s 
                                                 
42 Fear of the adverse consequences of liquidity as well as credit losses have at times induced the regulators not to 
give haircuts to uninsured debt claimants, particularly at large banks, after failing the institution by revoking its 
charter and ousting shareholders and management.   This is often incorrectly termed “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF).  This 
has proven highly costly and inefficient.  Losses tend to increase and ultimate resolution is only postponed, at which 
time losses borne by the FDIC or taxpayer.   
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assets..  This occurs either through a transfer of the insured deposits to another solvent bank, 
which assumes the liabilities, generally with and offsetting financial payment from the FDIC, or 
less frequently, through a payout.
43  The FDIC can generally make such speedy payments as they 
have been monitoring problem banks carefully under PCA and have access to the bank’s records 
on eligible insured deposits. 
44 In contrast, uninsured depositors and other creditors generally 
receive receivership certificates and are paid in order of their legal priority as proceeds are 
received from the sale of the bank assets.  Unless there is an active secondary market for these 
certificates, uninsured creditors receiving these certificates may suffer liquidity difficulties.  To 
maximize efficiency, these depositors should share in any credit losses but not suffer liquidity 
losses.  To achieve this, the FDIC has the authority to make advance payments to these claimants 
on the basis of estimated or average recovery amounts before it has actually collected the 
proceeds (Kaufman and Seelig, 2002).  If payments are made at the time of legal closure, this 
procedure is essentially equivalent to not having physical closed the institution.  Advance 
dividends also permit the estimated recovery value of uninsured deposits to be transferred to a 
newly chartered bridge bank with immediate access by depositors.  In bridge banks, borrowers 
generally maintain access to their existing credit lines.  This further reduces any liquidity losses.  
The FDIC is able to make advance dividends as it has access to a pool of funds provided by 
premiums paid by banks and can borrow a limited amount from the U.S. Treasury. 
  Estimates of the recovery value of the funds advanced as dividends tend to be on the 
conservative side because the FDIC absorbs the loss if it overestimates the recovery amounts.  If 
                                                 
43 Recent survey of deposit insurance practices indicates that few countries (only about 15%) pay insured depositors 
within 3 months (see Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali, and Laeven, 2005 and Kaufman and Seelig, 2002).  In large part 
this reflects that the insurance agency has insufficient information on the identify of the insured depositors and the 
amount of deposits insured,and requires the claimant to file a claim.  In the US, the FDIC generally has the 
necessary information and typically does not require depositors to file claims.   
 
44 The FDIC currently does not have information on all insured depositors at the largest banks but has issued a 
proposal for obtaining this information.   
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it underestimates the recovery amounts, it makes additional payments to the claimants later.  The 
FDIC, in its capacity of receiver, can borrow the necessary funds to make advance dividend 
payments from its corporate capacity, which has access to the FDIC accumulated fund.     
  The FDIC used advance dividends briefly in a number of resolutions in the early 1980s 
and early 1990s, when it did not fully protect most or all uninsured debt claimants.  But probably 
because most bank failures in the U.S. since the mid-1990s have involved small banks, the FDIC 
has not used advance dividends often since. 
  Use of bridge banks and advance dividends to minimize liquidity losses, especially in 
combination with the previous principle of preventing or, at least, minimizing credit losses, 
should eliminate much of the fear of bank failures.  It should permit efficient resolutions of large 
banks without strong negative reactions by the affected depositors and having to invoke the idea 
that some banks are “too-big-too-fail.”   
  D.  Prompt Re-privatization and Recapitalization 
  FDICIA requires that insolvencies be resolved at least cost to the FDIC.  This also 
reduces losses to depositors at domestic offices who share the same priority.  The requirement 
encourages rapid sale of bank assets after legal closure and is an attempt to deal with the fact that 
experience suggests, on average, that assets lose value the longer they are held in receivership.  
Re-privatization can be more difficult when banks are publicly owned, including bridge banks.  
Public ownership of banks is not always rooted in the desire to allocate resources efficiently.  
Nor do publicly owned institutions necessarily seek to maximize profits.  Rather, the intent may 
be to reallocate funds for socially desirable purposes or for political purposes.  Thus, when a 
government-sponsored bank becomes insolvent, the government is likely to keep the institution 
in operation regardless of its financial condition, and its return to solvency is likely to be slower.    
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The consequence is that losses are likely to continue and the ultimate cost of resolution to the 
taxpayer is likely to be larger than it otherwise would. 
  To minimize government forbearance and its attendant costs, insolvent banks should be 
sold to the private sector in whole or parts, as soon as this can be done efficiently.  Indeed, in the 
U.S., the maximum life of a bridge bank is specified by law to be no longer than two years, with 
three one-year extensions (which is probably longer than necessary).  Moreover, the sale should 
be on terms that provide sufficient private capital to ensure that, after adjusting for any 
guarantees to the buyers, the resulting institution will attain, at minimum, “adequately 
capitalized” status, if not “well capitalized” status, to guard against a quick return to insolvency.  
Again, because under PCA the FDIC is aware of most pending insolvencies, it can begin the 
bidder search process for most banks before legal closure and the actual bidding at closure.  As 
noted, larger banks may need to be bridged to give the FDIC additional time to sell to the highest 
bidders without having to resort to fire-sale losses or otherwise being forced to unwind the bank 
inefficiently. 
 
VIII.  Proposed Solution To Cross-Border Branching in the EU 
  To date, little progress has been made to deal with the supervisory and failure resolution 
issues raised by cross-border banking organizations.  The principle focus has been on obtaining 
cooperation and data sharing among responsible supervisory agencies within the existing 
decentralized regulatory framework.  For example, the major financial public policy authorities   
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of the European Union member countries have recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
on Cooperation in Financial Crisis Situations that announced in a press release (May 14, 2005).
45   
    Largely motivated by inquiries by the Nordea Bank about the feasibility of taking 
advantage of the new European Company Statute in order to reorganize itself, the Nordic 
countries have pushed ahead and established formal memoranda of understandings on joint 
supervisory policies and agreements governing the treatment of institutions in financial distress 
(Mayes 2006).
46   The bank considered replacing its cross-border subsidiaries, which are 
currently supervised by regulators in the countries where they are chartered,  with branches to be 
supervised by Swedish authorities, where Noreda would remain headquartered.  The converted 
subsidiaries’ deposits would be insured by the Swedish deposit guarantee system. But financial 
stability and lender of last resort functions would remain the responsibilities of host countries, 
where Nordea is often more significant than in Sweden.   
  Mayes(2005) describes in detail the contingency efforts of the Nordic country 
supervisors to plan and assign supervisory activities and sort out ex ante how they might respond 
to a crisis, should the new Nordea  organization experience financial difficulties.  While 
Nordea’s plan appears to  be stalled at this point, the problems and issues that Nordic country 
regulators and insurers began to focus on deal with what is likely to become the dominant issue 
for large European banks in the future.  The discussions  highlight the complexities in structuring 
shared regulatory responsibility within the current European framework. 
                                                 
45 Press Release, “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Banking Supervisors, Central Banks and Finance 
Ministries of the European Union in Financial Crisis Situations,” May 14, 2005, 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2005/html/pr050518_1.en.html) The MOU is not a public document.   
46 The bank is headquartered in Sweden and operates subsidiary banks in that country as well as 
Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden.  In addition it has branches in Estonia, Poland, 
Singapore and New York City.  According to Mayes (2006) Nordea holds the dominant market 
share in Finland, with a 40% market share; 25% of the market in Denmark; 20% in Sweden and 
15% in Norway.   
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  We are skeptical that voluntary cooperative arrangements will work when put to the test 
in a crisis, especially if substantial commitment of  a country’s treasury funds should prove 
necessary to either pay out depositors or to rescue the institution should it experience financial 
difficulties.  However, the efficiency advantages of cross-border branching are too large to 
discard, and the supervisory issues will arise again.   
  In lieu of cooperation, we would propose an alternative, when combined with the four 
point proposal for efficient resolution of trouble institutions discussed earlier, would significantly 
reduce the home-host country conflict and loss-sharing problems and enhance financial stability, 
while co-existing within the current regulatory framework.  We propose that as a condition of 
obtaining a single cross-border branching charter under the European Company Statute, any 
banking institution be required to subject itself to a system of Prompt Corrective Action ( PCA ) 
and Structured Early Intervention and Resolution (SEIR ) that would be administered consistent 
with the four point program.   
  While we leave the ultimate legal structure of such an agreement to the lawyers, 
necessary provisions would include a critical, positive capital ratio that would trigger resolution.  
In the event that this trigger capital threshold is breached, the institution’s shareholders would be 
required to return its charter back to the appropriately designed supervisory regulator 
(presumably the home country) and be put in statutory receivership to be resolved. 
  The numerical value of the capital-asset trigger ratio could be determined in a couple of 
ways.  It could be set uniformly across the Euro-area.  Alternatively, it could be determined by 
the home country and would be the same for all banks chartered in the country.  Competition 
among countries would prevent this ratio from being chosen inefficiently.  If set too high, banks   
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would not choose the country for their charter.  If set too low, the deposit insurer would be liable 
for larger payments to other countries.    
  The home country or designated supervisor would have several options to resolve the 
problems.  It could  liquidate the bank by selling the assets separately, sell the bank as a whole or 
operate it temporarily as a bridge bank.  For large entities, the bridge bank would mean that it 
could be opened immediately and services would be maintained almost seamlessly.  Liquidity 
losses would be minimized.  The bank would not be liquidated, thus avoiding the negative 
externalities that have caused so much concern.    
  If the regulator is able to resolve an institution before its capital turns negative, there is 
no insolvency or bankruptcy and no losses to depositors and other creditors.  Only if  regulators  
fail to catch an intuition before its capital turns negative and  it becames insolvent would it be 
necessary to invoke bankruptcy resolution procedures and assign losses to depositors and other 
creditors.  To deal with an insolvent institution efficiently, it would be useful  as a condition for 
granting a charter under the new European Charter statute, for the EU to require member 
countries to  adopt a separate bankruptcy resolution code for banks.  Such a statute could be 
based on that applicable to banks in the United States that gives regulators the power to legally 
close banks and assign pro-rata losses to depositors and other creditors (Bliss and 
Kaufman(2006)).    
  The proposal would have several advantages.  If the bank is successfully put into 
resolution before it’s capital is depleted, the home country does not impose losses on depositors 
in either the home or host countries.  Thus, the differences in deposit insurance schemes among 
countries discussed earlier decrease in importance.  The rule requiring the institution to 
voluntarily give up its charter may be seen as a cost imposed on the banks for the privilege of   
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being able to branch across national boundaries.  Since the shareholders, as a condition of 
obtaining the charter, ex ante have agreed to give up their charter, there are no issues of “taking 
of property.”  Any residual value will be returned to the shareholders.  This is similar to 
conditions any insurance company imposes of its insurees in their contracts.  Shareholders, who 
are unwilling to recapitalize a troubled institution to bring it up to regulatory standards, indicate 
by their lack of action their believe that the institution as presently organized and operated is no 
longer a going concern.  Finally, there would be less incentive on the part of regulatory 
authorities to engage in forbearance.  Both mangers and creditors of the institution would clearly 
understand when and under what conditions a troubled institution would be forced into 
resolution mode and this would tend to reinforce market discipline.  Finally, regulatory agency 
problems associated with overlapping jurisdictions and deposit insurance schemes would be 
eliminated, because the scope and nature of regulatory responsibilities would be specified ex ante 
and perfectly clear.    
   
IX. Conclusions  
  The focus of this study has been on the structure of supervisory and deposit insurance 
systems in cross-border banking through branching with particular emphasis on the EU and the 
related aspects of failure resolution and coordination when financial problems arise.  The issue is 
of importance and deserves attention because the costs of any resulting crisis may more than 
offset the efficiency benefits of the branching.  We have identified a number of issues and 
concerns about the present system design that are likely to result in higher than necessary costs 
of insolvencies in cross-border banking.  To date, little progress appears to have been made in 
the EU in dealing with them.  Indeed, as both cross-boarder branches and subsidiaries increase in   
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importance in host EU countries, the resulting potential dangers of the current structure. are 
likely to become large and may not only reduce aggregate welfare in the affected countries 
substantially when foreign banks with domestic branches or subsidiaries approach insolvency, 
but also threaten financial stability.  Serious doubts are cast about the longer-term viability of the 
single passport concept for cross-border branch banking under the existing institutional 
environment.    
To provide a more efficient arrangement, we propose four principles to ensure the 
efficient resolution of bank failures, should they occur, with minimum, if any, credit and 
liquidity losses.  These include: prompt legal closure of institutions before they become 
economically insolvent, prompt identification of claims and assignment of losses, prompt 
reopening of failed institutions and prompt recapitalizing and re-privatization of failed 
institutions.   Implementing these proposals would go a long way towards mitigating or possibly 
even eliminating many of the potential agency and related problems inherent in the current 
multiple and confusing EU crisis resolution and deposit insurance regimes across countries.   
Finally, we propose a  mechanism to put such a scheme into place quickly in the case where a 
cross-border banking organization seeks to take advantage of the liberal cross-border branching 
provisions in the single banking license available to banks in the EU.  In return for the privilege 
of such a license, the bank agrees to be subject to a legal closure rule as a positive capital ratio 
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The US has experimented extensively with decentralized deposit insurance systems that 
were not creatures of the federal government. 
47Most of these systems failed within a few years. 
In every case, the insurance systems were unable to meet unusual demands for a payout when 
either a very large institution got into financial difficulty or many smaller institutions failed at 
the same time. The same fate befell funds quite recently in Ohio in 1985 and Rhode Island in 
1991 (see Kane (1987) and Pukkinen and Rosengren (1993)). .  
There were several design flaws in these deposit insurance systems (see Pulkkinen and 
Rosengren(1993)) that could have significant implications for the EU. First, the systems tended 
to be critically under funded. Second, they tended to be undiversified in one of two ways. Either 
they were undiversified because the institutions being insured were not geographically disbursed 
and hence were vulnerable to regional business cycles or economic shocks, or they were 
undiversified because the failure of one or two large institutions was sufficient to bankrupt the 
funds. Third, they often had poorly designed governance systems, and this was particularly the 
case in the privately sponsored plans. Finally, when threatened with collapse, there was not the 
recognition that what provided the credibility to the plan was not so much the size of the fund, 
but the willingness of the sponsoring entity – the particular state legislature – to make good on 
the guarantees the fund offered. 
Many of the same design flaws in these state-sponsored systems appear to be potentially 
inherent in many of the systems being put in place in the EMU.  Any fund whose insured base is 
not adequately diversified or that does not have the ability or willingness to use taxpayers 
                                                 
47 These started with the New York State safety fund and culminated with the failure of the Rhode Island Share and 
Deposit Indemnity Corporation in 1991. Between 1908 and 1917 a total of eight states established deposit insurance 
systems. These included Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, Texas, Mississippi, South Dakota, North 
Dakota, and Washington. See Thies and Gerlowski (1989).   
 51
resources, should fund resources be depleted, will not likely stand up to the costly failure of a 
few large banks.   These diversification issues are especially important in those EU countries 
with only one or two major institutions where the failure of even one might endanger the entire 
fund.  Smaller countries, in particular,  with only a few relatively large institutions are more 
likely to experience funding problems than larger countries.  At a minimum, this means that 
reliance upon private deposit insurance systems, which the EU directive permits, seems 
extremely risky.  Moreover, the fact that the fund is private may still not insulate taxpayers from 
fiscal responsibility, expecially when the fund is jointly managed with both private and public 
officials from either the central bank, Ministry of Finance, or Supervisory Authority.  This 
government involvement raises the perception of an implicit government backing, even without 
official recognition of that responsibility. 
What most architects of deposit insurance schemes seem to miss is that it is nearly 
impossible to determine ex ante whether or not a fund is adequately funded. More importantly, 
what gives the fund credibility, especially when the financial problems in one institution threaten 
to spill over to others, is not the size of the fund per se but rather the willingness to make good 
on the guarantees should the fund run out of resources.  The differences in arrangements within 
the EU raise considerable questions about how responsibilities will be handled in the event that a 
fund gets in trouble.  For example, Table 5 shows that some schemes are supposedly fully 
funded, some are only funded with ex post premiums or levies, some can make special 
assessments on its members over and above normal contributions, some can borrow from the 
public or central bank, and some funds, such as in Latvia, have an explicit provision committing 
the government to provide funds.     
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Kane (1987) argues that waffling and legislative delay was a major problem in the case of 
the ODGF that was in part political posturing, but tendency to delay and avoid recognition of 
losses applies to federally sponsored programs as well. The events surrounding the eventual 
collapse of the FSLIC in the US demonstrates the propensity of legislators to avoid facing up to 
the problem.  
The circumstances surrounding the ODGF crisis also points to another problem related to 
the split of responsibilities for systemic risk between the member countries of the EU and the 
ECB. Specifically, the longer the delay in attempting to deal with the problem, the more likely it 
is that runs or systemic problems would develop that would convert what might be a problem in 
one institution into a problem for the deposit system itself.  Individual member nation’s 
regulatory and legislative authorities, to the extent that they may be reluctant to impose costs on 
their own taxpayers, have incentives to delay and gamble that a broader authority would step in 
and assume the responsibilities for a crisis.
48  
In Ohio, of the losses to the ODGF, amounted to about $170 million, which was more 
than the state legislature was willing to appropriate to make good on the guarantees implicit in its 
state sponsorship.  This episode illustrates two facts. First, it is the ability to tap into taxpayer 
resources as needed rather then the size of the fund that provides the credibility of the deposit 
insurance guarantee. The initial reluctance of the State of Ohio to live up to its commitment with 
provides an interesting comparison to many of the countries currently in or entering the EU.  
Ohio’s state gross domestic product (GDP) in 1985 was $176 billion. This is larger than 8 of the 
original EU countries’ GDP including: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, 
                                                 
48  This observation is not only rooted in experience but also in theory.  See Santos and Kahn(2002), also Garcia and 
Nieto (2005).   
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Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. It is also larger that the real GDP of all the newly admitted 
countries to the EU.  
It is not clear why countries with even smaller resources would be more willing than a 
relatively richer state like Ohio to honor its deposit insurance liabilities, especially, if payments 
were to be made to resident depositors in other, larger EU countries. The temptation on the part 
of poorer counties and their politicians to gamble, in the hope that they will be bailed out by the 
ECB should a major crisis arise.  A chief difference, of course, between the resolution of the 
ODGF crisis and a potential deposit insurance crisis in the EU is that there is no federal deposit 
insurance fund in the EU to which losses could be shifted. Table 9 contains an assessment of the 
combination of factors that would suggest agency problems would be the greatest should a 
financial crisis or the failure of a large bank materialize that threatened the solvency of the 
deposit insurance fund.  We conjecture based on past experience that the these problems would 
be greatest in smaller countries, in those countries with unfunded plans, where the banking 
system is highly concentrated, with a large number of foreign banks operated in the system and 
there were strong perceptions of implicit or the existence of government guarantees for the 
insurance fund.  
 
Table 1 Percent of Cross-Border Penetration of Banks as % of Assets 
Country  1997 1999 2001 2002 2003  2004 
Austria 3  2  19  21  19  19 
Belgium  23 20 23 22 21  21 
Denmark 4  4  17  18  17  15 
Finland  8 9 7 9 7  59 
France 7  6  11  11  10  9 
Germany  2 3 3 5 5  5 
Greece 11  10  4  6  19  25 
Ireland  46 50 48 37 35  36 
Italy  6 7 5 5 5  6 
Luxembourg 83 88 88 89 89  89 
Netherlands  5  4 10 9 10  11 
Portugal  13 13 24 24 26  25 
Spain  9 7 8 9  10  11 
Sweden 15  29  6  6  7  8 
United  Kingdom  25 26 25 23 23  26 
EU  15  13 13 15 15 15  16 
Cyprus     16  17  18  23 
Czech Republic      68  90  92  87 
Estonia     91  90  89  98 
Hungary     55  53  56  56 
Lithuania     47  56  51  74 
Latvia     24  21  22  39 
Malta     49  42  40  39 
Poland     60  59  59  59 
Slovenia     14  16  18  19 
Slovakia     na  81  82  88 
NEW EU 10      47  53  53  58 





Relative Size of Old and Accession Economics 
Country name  Income group      
 
GDP 2005         
Purchasing Power Parity 
Basis 
EU GDP Share 2005     
Purchasing Power Parity 
Basis 
GDP per capita 2005      
Purchasing Power Parity Basis 
Old Members        
        
Austria High  income  $269,400,000,000  2.22% $32,900 
Belgium High  income  $329,300,000,000  2.71% $31,800   
Denmark High  income  $182,100,000,000  1.50% $33,500   
Finland High  income  $158,400,000,000  1.31% $30,300   
France High  income  $1,816,000,000,000  14.97% $29,900   
Germany High  income  $2,446,000,000,000  20.16% $29,700   
Greece High  income  $242,800,000,000  2.00% $22,800   
Ireland High  income  $136,900,000,000  1.13% $34,100   
Italy High  income  $1,645,000,000,000  13.56% $28,300   
Luxembourg High  income  $29,370,000,000  0.24% $62,700   
Netherlands High  income  $500,000,000,000  4.12% $30,500   
Portugal High  income  $194,800,000,000  1.61% $18,400   
Spain High  income  $1,014,000,000,000  8.36% $25,100   
Sweden High  income  $266,500,000,000  2.20% $29,600   
United Kingdom  High income  $1,867,000,000,000  15.39% $30,900   
        
New Members         
        
Cyprus High  income  $16,820,000,000  0.14% $21,600   
Czech Rep.  Upper middle income  $184,900,000,000  1.52% $18,100   
Estonia  Upper middle income  $21,810,000,000  0.18% $16,400   
Hungary  Upper middle income  $159,000,000,000  1.31% $15,900   
Lithuania  Upper middle income  49,410,000,000  0.41% $14,100 
Latvia  Upper middle income  $29,420,000,000  0.24% $12,800   
Malta High  income  $7,485,000,000  0.06% $18,800   
Poland  Upper middle income  $489,300,000,000  4.03% $12,700   
Slovak Republic  Upper middle income  $85,140,000,000  0.70% $15,700   
Slovenia High  income  $42,090,000,000  0.35% $20,900   
Source: CIA, The World Fact Book 2005 
Table 3 
Deposit Insurance Characteristics by Country
* 
Country name  Deposit Insurance Coverage of Foreign Institutions and deposits 
Old Members   
   
Austria 
Einlagensicherung der Banken & 
Bankiers Gesellschaft m.b.H. 
 
Only accounts denominated in EUROs and currencies of other EEA countries 
Belgium 
Deposit And Financial 
Instrument Protection Fund 
Only accounts denominated in EUROs and currencies of other EEA countries 
Denmark 
The Guarantee Fund for 
Depositors and Investors 
Foreign currency deposits are covered if made in  Denmark 
Finland 
Finnish Deposite Guarantee Fund 
Foreign currency deposits are covered if made in  Finland 
France 
Deposit insurance (warranty) 
Fund 
Yes, but only accounts denominated in EUROs and currencies of other EEA countries 
Germany 
The German Private Commercial 
Banks Compensation Scheme for 
Depositors and Investor 
(There are other schemes in 
Germany as well) 
Yes if made in Germany 
Greece 
Hellenic Deposit Guarantee Fund 
Yes, covers deposits in branches in EU and in branches of non EU countries unless equivalent coverage is available to those 
branches 
Ireland 
Deposit Protection Scheme 
All deposits made in Ireland 
Italy 
Interbank Deposit Protection 
Fund 
Yes - The Interbank Deposit Protection Fund also compensates the depositors of foreign branches of Italian banks. In the case of 
Italian banks operating in EU countries, the amount of compensation cannot exceed the protection guaranteed by the host country. 
Luxembourg 




Collective Guarantee Scheme 
(CGS) 
Yes, but only accounts denominated in EUROs and currencies of other EEA countries 
Portugal 
Deposit Guarantee Fund 
Yes, deposits are guaranteed regardless of the currency in which they are denominated, and whether the depositor is resident or 
non-resident in Portugal. 
* Austria has 4 different funds, Germany has 6 funds, Italy has 3 funds, Portugal has 2 funds, Spain has 3 funds- In each case the main insurance funds for 
commercial banks or credit institutions is listed.   
 
 
Table 3 (cont) 
Deposit Insurance Characteristics by Country 
Country name  Deposit Insurance Coverage of Foreign Institutions and deposits 
Spain 
Deposit Guarantee Fund for 
Banking Institutions 
Yes  Deposits in Spain or in institutions from another member state of the European Union, whatever the currency in which they 
are denominated, with the exclusion of those deposited by financial institutions, public administrations and certain other persons 
linked to credit institutions in any of the ways envisaged in the regulations. 
Sweden 
Deposit Guarantee Board 
Yes, all deposits made in Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme (FSCS) 
Yes, all deposits in EUROs or EEA currencies 
   
New Members   
   
Cyprus 
Deposit Protection Scheme 
No 
Czech Rep. 
Deposit Insurance Fund 
Yes but compensation for foreign exchange deposits is disbursed in the Czech currency. 
Estonia 
Deposit Guarantee Fund 
Deposits of foreign credit institutions are guaranteed  
Hungary 




State Company "Deposit and 
Investment Insurance 
Yes, Deposits of branches of EU headquartered institutions are eligible for insurance. Excluded depositors’ deposits are deposits 
held with the daughter banks of Lithuanian banks or divisions of these banks operating beyond the territory of the Republic of 
Lithuania. Deposits in currencies of foreign countries that are not members of the European Union, with the exception of the USA, 
are non-insurable. 
Latvia 
Deposit Guarantee Fund 
yes 
Malta 
Depositor Compensation Scheme 
Yes 
Poland 
Bank Guarantee Fund 
Yes 
Slovak Republic 
Deposit Protection Fund (DPF) 
Yes 
Slovenia 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
Yes 
Source: Hall(2001) and Table 11 Sources.  
 
Table 4 
Insured Deposits by Country in the EU 
Country name  Deposit Insurance Coverage 
Old Members   
   
Austria EUR  20,000 
Belgium  EUR 20,000 on deposits and EUR 20,000 for financial instruments for a total of EURO 40,000 
Denmark  DKK 300,000 deposits covered net of loans (about 40,000 EURO 
Finland  FIM 150,000 - up to 25000 Euro, deposits will be covered in full if depositor demonstrates that the deposit represented the sale of a residence. 
France  EUR 70,000  
Germany  30% of bank's equity capital (All non-bank deposits are covered up to a limit of 30% of the liab. capital with a  minimum limit is 1.5 million Euro, 
and given that the average equity size of a commercial bank is 295.5 million Euro, the average limit is around 90 million Euro.); official 
coinsurance 90% to EUR 20,000  
Greece EUR  20,000 
Ireland  90% of EUR 20,000 
Italy  ITL 200 Mil.- equivalent to 103,291 Euro  
Luxembourg  The total amount of the Guarantee will in no case exceed 20,000 euros (deposit guarantee) + 20,000 euros (investor compensation)= 40,000 euros 
per customer 
Netherlands EUR  20,000 
Portugal EUR  25,000 
Spain EUR  20,000 
Sweden SEK  250,000 
United Kingdom  100% of first ₤2000 and 90% of next ₤33,000  
   
New Members   
   
Cyprus  Cyprus equivalent of EUR 20,000 
Czech Rep.  90% with max coverage of 25,000 EURO equivalent 
Estonia  EUR 12 782 /EEK 200 000 effective from December 31, 2005 
EUR 20 000 / EEK 313 000 effective from December 31, 2007 at the latest 
Hungary  EUR 20,000/HUF 6,555,555 at EU accession 
Lithuania  Currently 14,481/LTL 50,000, EUR 17,377/LTL 60,000 from 1/1/07 but as of Jan. 1 2008 coverage will be 20,000 euro 
Latvia  EUr 8535/6000 lats at present, Eur 12,802/9000 lats from 12/31/07, EUR 18,492/13000 lats from 12/31/08 
Malta  EUR 20,000, about 8600 Maltese lira 
Poland   Since 2003 the Fund's guarantee has covered  in 100% monies up to a sum of PLN equivalent of 1,000 EUR, and in 90% the sums between the 
value of 1,000 to 22,500 EUR (as counted inclusively regardless of the number of contracts concluded between the depositor and the bank). 
Slovak Republic  90%, not to exceed EUR 20,000 




EU Deposit Insurance Fund Governance and Funding 
Country 
name 
Funding Premiums    Administration 
Old 
Members 
    
      
Austria  Government/ Private Funding-no permanent 
fund-ex post 
Not risk based - pro rata, ex post 
assessments on protected deposit 
base 
Managing directors elected by General Assembly with representation from each 
trade association.  Are accountable to General Assembly 
Belgium Government/  Private Funding  State can 
provide limited funding-permanent fund 
Not risk based- flat rate of .02% but 
if fund liquid assets fall below 
critical level premiums may be 
raised by .04% 
Joint Private Official 
Denmark  Capital must be at least DKK 3.2 billion 
(thousands of millions).  Any of  three separate 
funds may, if necessary and within prescribed 
limits, borrow from the other sections. In 
addition, the Fund may raise loans if its capital 
is insufficient-permanent fund 
Not risk based – Flat rate levy with 
max rate of  .2% of covered deposits 
Joint Private Official  
Finland  Fund members pay an admission fee equal to 
one-tenth of the total amount of the expenses of 
actual operations of the Fund for the previous 
financial period, but at least 17 000 euro. The 
Fund may borrow from members if funding is 
insufficient in proportion that their liabilities 
were of covered liabilities-permanent fund 
Not risk based - fixed 0.05% charge 
and a variable premium that can 
range up to .25% depending upon 
need for funds 
 
Privately administered by elected represented from member banks (both domestic 
and foreign according to rules set by Min. of Fin and supervised by FSA 
France  Ex post assessments as needed. Fonds de 
Garantie des Dépôts can borrow funds from 
members and/or call for additional funds 
determined by a ruling of the Comité de la 
réglementation bancaire et financière (French 
Banking and Finances Committee)-no 
permanent fund 
Not risk based – ex post levy -  
on demand but limited. Contribution 
may not be less than € 2,000 for a 
half-yearly contribution and € 4,000 
for the subscription of certificates of 
association. 
 
Private   
 
Table  5 (cont) 
EU Deposit Insurance Fund Governance and Funding 
Country 
name 
Funding Premiums    Administration 
Germany  Private Funding. There is no public funding. 
Bundesbank may not by law be lender of last 
resort for the deposit insurance schemes. One 
time payment of .09%.-permanent funds 
Not risk based (but hybrid) – 
mixture of ex-ante and ex-post 
premiums. Base rate of .03% but 
may range from 0.0 to .06% of 
covered liabilities basis. There can 
also be an extraordinary premium of 
up to 100% of a regular premium in 
case the funds are not sufficient. 
Banks that have paid for more than 
20 years and are classified in the 
lowest risk category(A), can be 
exempted from premium payment. 
Banks that are classified as higher 
risks(B or C), are required to pay an 
additional  premium of up to 250% 
of the regular premium. 
 
The scheme is managed by a commission of 10 bank representatives that are 
accountable to the general assembly of the Association.  
Greece  3,000 million GDR with 60% provided by 
Bank of Greece and 40% provided by Hellenic 
Banks’ Association-permanent fund   
Not risk based - Annual premiums 
are graduated (decreasing) as size of 
deposits increases from 1.25% for 
smallest size class up to .025% for 
largest size class 
Administered jointly between Bank of Greece, Hellenic Bank Association and 
Ministry of Finance by 7-member board chaired by one of the Deputy Governors 
of the Bank of Greece. The other six members shall be selected from the Bank of 
Greece (2), the Ministry of National Economy (1), and the Hellenic Banks’ 
Association (3). 
Ireland  Private funding-permanent fund  Not risk based - annual premiums of 
.20% of covered deposits 
Public 
Italy  Government/ Private Funding - Bank of Italy 
can make low-interest loans to facilitate payout 
of large bank-no permanent fund 
Risk based  (levied ex post) - 
Premiums base on sliding scale of 
protected deposits with marginal 
premiums increasing as size 
increases from .4% to .8% 
 
Private, but decisions must be approved by Central Bank   
 
Table  5 (cont) 
EU Deposit Insurance Fund Governance and Funding 
Country 
name 
Funding Premiums    Administration 
Luxembourg  Private Funding-no permanent fund  Not risk based – ex post premiums  Private 
Netherlands  Government/ Private Funding - with 
government providing interest free bridge 
financing-no permanent fund 
Not risk based - Ex post as needed, 
up to a max of 5% of proportion of 
bank's deposits to total protected 
deposits in scheme 
Jointly managed by central bank and banking sector trade organizations 
Portugal  Government/ Private Funding-permanent fund  Risk-based, 0.1% to 0.2% + more 
in emergencies The annual 
contributions are defined according 
to the monthly average of the 
deposits made in the previous year 
and to the fixed contribution rate, 
weighted by the solvency ratio of 
each institution (the lower this 
ratio, the higher the contribution). 
The payment of the annual 
contributions may be partly (up to a 
limit of 75 per cent) replaced by an 
irrevocable contract, guaranteed 
where necessary by securities 
having a low credit risk and high 
liquidity. If the resources are 
insufficient to comply with its 
commitments, the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund may ask for special 
contributions or resort to loans. 
 
Public   
 
Table  5 (cont) 
EU Deposit Insurance Fund Governance and Funding 
Country 
name 
Funding Premiums    Administration 
Spain  Government/ Private Funding - Central bank 
can make loans to fund – permanent fund 
Not risk based - .6% for CBs, .4% 
for SBs and 1% for credit 
cooperatives, extraordinary 
contributions may be required, and 
exceptionally, extraordinary 
contributions made by the Central 
Bank when they are authorized by 
Law. 
 
Joint Private Official- Board comprised of 4 members from Bank of Spain and 4 
from member institutions 
Sweden  Government/ Private Funding-permanent fund  Risk-based, 0.5% now, 0.1% later 





Private Funding-no permanent fund  Not risk based - Fees determined on 
basis of projections of next year's 
losses-for banks fees are limited to 
.3% of protected deposits each year 
 
Government legislated and privately administered. Board appointed by FSA 
      
New 
Members 
    
      
Cyprus  Private Funding—permanent fund  Not risk based - levies determined 
by the fund after initial contribution 
is made 
 
Joint and Private Official by Central Bank and 5 member Management Committee 
consisting of the governor of the Central Bank, the head of the Banking 
Supervision and Regulation Division of the Central Bank and  two 
representatives of the banks nominated by the Association of Commercial Banks 
and one representative of the Minister of Finance nominated by the Minister of 
Finance. 
     
   
 
Table  5 (cont) 
EU Deposit Insurance Fund Governance and Funding 
Country 
name 
Funding Premiums    Administration 
Czech 
Rep. 
Government/ Private Funding - Gov't provides 
50% of funds for compensation of depositors, 
Central Bank and Gov't will provide loans to 
cover short fall. .In case the Fund’s reserves are 
not sufficient to disburse compensation, the 
Fund has to acquire any and all funds on the 
market. There is no government guarantee for 
its borrowing-permanent fund 
 
Not risk based - 0.1% of insured 
deposits including accrued interest 
and .05% for building and savings 
banks 
. 
Fund is independent institution managed by a five-member Board of 
Administration. At least one member of the Board is appointed from among 
employees of the Czech National Bank and at least two members are appointed 
from among members of the boards of directors of banks.  
Estonia  Government/ Private Funding – Govy’t 
provided initial funding and banks paid EEK 
50,000.  Fund cn borrow with out gov't 
guarantee and can ask gov't to borrow limited 
amt on its behalf. Initial contribution for 
Deposit Guarantee Sectoral Fund - 50 000 
kroons-permanent fund 
Not risk based - quarterly 
contributions for  Deposit Guarantee 
Sectoral Fund – 0.07 per cent of 
guaranteed deposits for Investor 
Protection Sectoral Fund 
 
8 member supervisory board: two members appointed by the Riigikogu; one by 
the Government  on recommendation of Minister of Finance; one by the President 
of the Bank of Estonia; one by the Financial Supervision Authority; one  by the 
organizations representing credit institutions; one member appointed by the 
organizations representing investment institutions; one member appointed by the 
organizations representing pension management companies. 
Hungary  Government/ Private Funding, - one-off 
admission fee on entry (0.5% of the member 's 
registered capital) – permanent fund 
Not risk based - .5% of deposits up 
to 1 mil. HUF, .3% between 1 and 6 
mil HUF, and .05 above 6 mil. HUF  
Board of Directors consists of Central Bank president, administrative secretary of 
Ministry of Finance, president of inspections, two delegates from insured 
institutions and managing director of DIF 
Latvia  Government/Private Funding with initial 
contribution of 50,000 lats.  If funds are 
insufficient, then payments will be made by 
gov’t 
Not risk based - .2% of deposits  Public 
Malta  Private Funding –permanent fund  
 
Not risk based – ex post 
assessments, administrative fees and 
income from investments 
Management Committee appointed by the MFSA. made up of persons 
representing MFSA, the Central Bank of Malta, investment firms, the banks and 
customers.  
Table  5 (cont) 
EU Deposit Insurance Fund Governance and Funding 
Country 
name 
Funding Premiums    Administration 
Poland  Permanent fund-joint gov’t private funding  Not risk based – Fees determined 
yearly and levied on deposits and 
off-balance sheet liabilities 
separately. 
 
Fund Council and Fund Management Board. The Fund Council consists of a 
chairman and ten members having appropriate university degrees and professional 
experience. The Fund Management Board shall consist of five members, including 
the President and his deputy.  Management Board is appointed by the Fund 
Council from among persons having the appropriate university degree and five 
years of service in the banking industry. 
Lithuania  Funded by banks and by government  Not risk based. Commercial banks 
and branches (departments) of 
foreign banks pay the Insurance 
Company insurance premiums, 
annually amounting to 0.45 percent 
of all insurable deposits 
Public - The Council is comprised of 6 members, appointed by the Government of 
the Republic of Lithuania. The Ministry of Finance proposes 3 candidates, the 
Bank of Lithuania – 2 candidates, the Securities Commission – 1 candidate. 
Slovak 
Republic 
Government/private-permanent fund  Not risk based – and range from 
0.1% to 0.3% for banks 
 
Joint Private Official 
Slovenia  Private funding –no permanent fund 
 
Not risk based – fee calculate on the 
basis of each bank’s share of 
guaranteed deposits 
Public, Bank of Slovenia 












Private v Publicly Managed 
Old Members        
        
Austria   Co-
insurance 
10  Managing directors elected by General assembly with representation from each trade association.  
Are accountable to General Assembly 
Belgium   Co-
insurance 
10  Joint Private Official 
Denmark   No  Co-
insurance 
0  Joint Private Official 
Finland   No  Co-
insurance 
0  Privately administered by member banks according to rules set by Min. of Fin and supervised by 
FSA, The Fund shall be administered by a Delegation elected by the member deposit banks and 
branches of foreign credit institutions and by a Board of Directors elected by the Delegation. At 
;east one of the directors shall reprsent the branches of the foreign credit institutions that are 
members of the fund. 
France   No  Co-
insurance 
0 Private 
Germany   Co-
insurance 
10  The scheme is managed by a commission of 10 bank 
representatives that are accountable to the general assembly of the Association. All 
groups of commercial banks are represented in the commission.' 
Greece   No  Co-
insurance 
0 Administered  jointly  between  Bank of Greece, Hellenic Bank Association and Ministry of 
Finance, law provides it is not a public institution,TEK is managed by a 7-member Board. The 
Board shall be chaired by one of the Deputy Governors of the Bank of Greece. The other six 
members shall be 
selected from the Bank of Greece (2), the Ministry of National Economy (1), and the 
Hellenic Banks’ Association (3). 
Ireland   Co-
insurance 10   
Public 
Italy   No  co-
insurance 
0  Private, but decisions must be approved by Central Bank 
Luxembourg  Yes - EU member 
chartered 
institutions may 






Netherlands   No  Co-
insurance 




Table 6 (cont) 








Private v Publicly Managed 
Portugal   No  Co-
insurance 
0 Public 
Spain   No  Co-
insurance 
0  Joint Private Official- Board comprised of 4 members from Bank of Spain and 4 from member 
institutions 









10%  Government legislated and privately administered. Board appointed by FSA 
        
New Members         
        
Cyprus   Co-
insurance 
10%  Joint and Private Official by Central Bank and Management Committee. The Committee shall 
consist of five members, the chairman, the vice-chairman and three other members. Chairman and 
vice-chairman shall be ex-officio the governor of the Central Bank and the head of the Banking 
Supervision and Regulation Division of the Central Bank, respectively. The three other members 
of the Committee appointed by the governor of the Central Bank and shall be two representatives 
of the banks nominated by the Association of Commercial Banks and one representative of the 
Minister of Finance nominated by the Minister of Finance. 
Czech Rep.    Co-
insurance 
10%  Public, The Fund is an independent institution managed by a five-member Board of 
Administration. The president, vice president and the other members of the Board are appointed 
and removed by the Finance Minister. At least one member of the Board is appointed from among 
employees of the Czech National Bank and at least two members 
are appointed from among members of the boards of directors of banks. The Board is the statutory 
body of the Fund and manages its activities. 
Estonia   Co-
insurance 
10% Joint  Private/Official-The  supervisory board shall consist of eight members appointed as follows: 
two members appointed by the Riigikogu; one member appointed by the Government of the 
Republic on the proposal of the Minister of Finance;  
one member appointed by the President of the Bank of Estonia; one member appointed by the 
Financial Supervision Authority; one member appointed by the organizations representing credit 
institutions; one member appointed by the organizations representing investment institutions; one 
member appointed by the organizations representing pension management companies. 
Hungary     Co-
insurance 
10  Joint Private Official, Board of Directors consists of Central Bank president, administrative 
secretary of Ministry of Finance, president of inspections, two delegates from insured institutions 
and managing director of DIF 




10  Public   
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Top off is 
mandatory and 
coverage is only 
for difference 
between insurance 

















0  Joint Private Official, Management Committee which is appointed by the MFSA. This Committee 
is made up of persons representing MFSA, the Central Bank of Malta, investment services 
intermediaries, the banks and customers. 
Poland Branches  of  EU 
banks when 
guarantee is lower 
than provided in 
Poland may join 





10%  Joint Private Official Fund Council and Fund Management Board. The Fund Council consists of a 
chairman and ten members having appropriate university degrees and professional experience 
.The Fund Management Board shall consist of five members, including the President and his 
deputy. The Management Board is appointed by the Fund Council from among persons having the 
appropriate university degree and five years of service in the banking industry. 
Slovak 
Republic 
Foreign bank can 
join fund if its 
deposits are not 
insured or available 
insurance is less 




10%  Joint Private Official 
Slovenia Participation  is 
required unless 




0  Public, Bank of Slovenia 













Legal Payment Requirements for 
Insured Deposits 
Old Members        
        
Austria  Financial Market Authority  NC  Financial Market Authority and 
bankruptcy court 
Within 3 months 
Belgium Bankruptcy  Court 
Notice is published in the 
Moniteur belge 
Claimants have two months 
to file claim,  Bankruptcy court 
 
2 months 
Denmark  Closure is by  
The Danish Financial 
Supervisory Authority (DFSA) 
Must request another 
institution to file claim.  
Depositors of failed bank 
will be notified within one 
month of failure, 





Shall be effected as soon as possible and not later 
than 3 months after the commencement of the 
suspension of payments or compulsory winding-
up. 
Finland  FSA declares that the bank had 
failed to meet its obligations.  
The FSA has 21 days to make 
this decision. 
The fund will notify 
depositors and also publish 
notice of its decision to pay 
out funds. 




3 months  - Failure to receive payment within the 
required time limit gives the depositor a claim 
against the fund in court. 
France  Commission Bancaire's notice 
prior court's declaration 
 
Customers notified by Fund 
and have 15 days to 
respond. 
Resolution overseen by banking 
supervisor 
 
3 months with the possibility for the Supervisory 
Commission to extend by 3 months again. 
Germany  Petition filed by Financial 
Supervisory Authority to court 
Creditors are notified by 
German compensation 
scheme within 21 days of 
notification of insolvency 
and claims must be filed in 
writing by creditors with 
the German compensation 
scheme within one year.   








Payments must be made within 3 months. 
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Legal Payment Requirements for Insured 
Deposits 
Greece  Bank of Greece and courts, 
21 days after an institution 
has failed to make payment 
on contractual obligations, 
then failure will have 
occurred 
Notification will take place in 
the press 






HDGF pays compensation in respect of unavailable 
deposits within three months of the date when the 
deposits became unavailable. This time limit may be 
extended by no more than two further 3month periods. 
Ireland  Determination by either the 
Irish Central Bank and 
Financial Services 
Regulatory Authority or a 
court ruling  
Claims must be filed by 
depositors  General Insolvency Laws 
 
3 months 
Italy  The Courts have the legal 
power to declare the 
insolvency status. However, 
the Bank of Italy, 
independently form the 
Courts’ declaration, can 
propose to the Minister of 
the Economy and Finance 
the compulsory 
administrative liquidation of 
a bank in each of the 
following cases: 
exceptionally serious 
violations of prudential 
requirements, exceptionally 




FITD subrogates in the right 
of depositors and carries out 
pay-offs directly.  
The 1993 Banking Law 

















The reimbursement of depositors shall be made, up to 
the equivalent of EURO 20,000 (twenty thousand) 
within three months of the compulsory liquidation 
order. The Bank of Italy may extend this term in 
exceptional circumstances or special cases, for a total 
period not to exceed nine months   
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Legal Payment Requirements for Insured 
Deposits 
Luxembourg  Petition filed by bank 
regulator-Commission de 
Surveillance du Secteur 
Financier (CSSF)-or 
institution itself to the court 
 
Claims must be made by 
depositors the AGDL and 
declaration to be made 
through the liquidators of the 
establishment. 
Law on the Financial Sector of April, 1993 
Court will appoint a bankruptcy 





Reimbursement starts as soon as claims have been 
verified and must be finished three months after the 
occurrence of in-availability of funds. The 
Luxembourg supervision authority may grant 3 
extensions of 3 months each of this deadline. 
Netherlands Nederlandsche  Bank  which 
is the supervisor must 
petition the court 
 
Nederlandsche Bank can 
declare insolvency and 
advertises in the newspapers for 
depositors to apply for 
compensation.. Victims of the 
bank failure can then register 
with De Nederlandsche Bank 
during a period of five months 
Act of the Supervision of the credit system 








As soon as possible but in any case no later than three 
months of the date on which the creditor or investor 
duly submitted his claims, recompense that creditor or 
investor for the amount of the claims covered by the 
scheme.  In very exceptional circumstances, decide that 
the period of three months shall be extended by a 




The Banco de Portugal, as the 
banking supervisory authority  
Management is required to 
notify the Banco de 
Portugal of the bank’s 
inability to meet its 
obligations, but Banco de 
Portugal may also intervene 
  Banco de Portugal may force a 
winding up pursuant to  Credit 
Institutions and Financial Companies: 
Legal Framework 
(approved by Decree-Law No. 298/92 of 
31 December and amended by Decree-
Laws 
No. 246/95 of 14 September, No. 232/96 
of 5 December, No. 222/99 of 22 June, 
No. 250/2000 of 13 October, No. 
285/2001 of 3 November, No. 201/2002 
of 26 September, No. 319/2002 of 28 
December 
and No. 252/2003 of 17 October). 
Repayment shall take place within a maximum of three 
months of the date on which deposits became 
unavailable; in exceptional circumstances and on a 
case-by-case basis, the Fund may apply to the Banco 
de Portugal for a maximum of three further extensions 
of the time limit, neither of which shall exceed three 
months. Without prejudice to the period of limitation 
set forth in the general law, the expiry of the time limit 
prescribed in the foregoing paragraph does not affect 
the depositors' right of compensation.   
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Legal Payment Requirements for Insured 
Deposits 
Spain  Bank of  Spain petitions 
court 
 
Depositors are not required to 
file a claim.  The insurer 
makes a record of the 
depositors who are entitled to 
compensation and  informs 
depositors of the events 
through ordinary mail of 
their right to compensation 
 
General insolvency laws and 
DISCIPLINE AND 
INTERVENTION OF CREDIT 
INSTITUTIONS 
Law 26/1988, of 29 July (BOE day 
30) 
(Correction of errors, BOE of 4 
August 1989 ), Authority to impose 
sanctions for very serious infractions 
shall rest with the Minister of 
Economy and Finance, at the 
proposal of the Bank of Spain, except 
for revocation of authorization, 
which shall be imposed by the 
Council of Ministers. 
Will start as soon as possible and shall take place 
within a maximum of three months of the date on 
which deposits became unavailable; the Funds may 
apply to the Banco de Espana for a maximum of three 
further extensions of the time limit, neither of which 








Reimbursements will start as soon as possible. They 
have to be done no later than 3 months after the 
institution is declared bankrupt. 
United 
Kingdom 
Bank files with court  If a bank or building society 
that becomes insolvent 
depositor will be contacted by 
the liquidator or by Financial 
Services Compensation 
Scheme and file a claim form 







All claims should be paid within 3 months (can be 
extended by a further 3 months or by actions of the 
court)   
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Legal Payment Requirements for Insured 
Deposits 
New Members         
Cyprus  Bank Supervision Dept., 
Central Bank of Cyprus or a 
court order  determines if 
bank unable to repay 
deposits 
Deposit Protection Scheme 
will collect information on 
depositors eligible for claims. 
Banking Law specifies that upon 
declaration by a court or revocation 
of the banking license by the Central 
Bank  constitutes grounds for its 
winding up by the Court on the 
application of, the Central Bank and 
the appointment of a receiver. 
 
 
Publish an announcement in the Official Gazette The 
Fund's Management Committee must proceed with the 
compensation payment within three months from the 
date deposits became unavailable, unless the Central 
Bank of Cyprus approves an extension in accordance 
with the provisions of the Regulations. 
 
 
Czech Rep.  Banking Supervision of 
CNB can impose 
conservatorship. Bank 
management responsible for 
notifying CNB of 
impending insolvency 
 
Compensation for an insured 
deposit claim shall be paid 
from the Fund to an eligible 
person after the Fund receives 
notification in writing from 
the Czech National Bank 
 
General bankruptcy statutes and Act 
No. 21/1992 Coll. 
of 20 December 1991, 
on Banks as amended 
 
If a bank is wound up and liquidated, 
the Czech National Bank shall have 
exclusive authority to submit a 
proposal for the nomination of the 
liquidator. In addition, the Czech 
National Bank shall have exclusive 
authority to submit a proposal for the 
dismissal of the 
liquidator and for the nomination of a 
new liquidator or a proposal for the 
winding up of the 
joint-stock company if the bank’s 
license has been revoked. The court 
shall rule on the Czech National 
Bank’s proposal the within 24 hours 
of the proposal being submitted. 
 
Reimbursement starts within 3 months after deposits 
become unavailable (may be prolonged twice by 3 
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Legal Payment Requirements for Insured 
Deposits 
Estonia Banking  Supervision 
Department of Estonia 
Central Bank can withdraw 
a banking license. 
 
Within three working days 
after the date on which 
deposits become unavailable, 
the Fund shall publish a notice 
in at least two daily national 
newspapers on at least two 
occasions setting out the name 
of the bank, the term and 
procedure for payment and a 
list of the documents required 
upon the payment of 
compensation 
 
Bankruptcy Act, Act on Credit 
Institutions – A bank may be wound 
up by the central bank (Eesti Pank) 
or on the basis of a court order the 
Bankruptcy Law . When legal 
insolvency is declared, the 
Liquidation Board or trustee in 
bankruptcy takes over. 
Payment must begin not later than thirty days after the 
date on which deposits become unavailable and 
completed within three months The Fund may extend 
the term by up to three months at a time, but not for 







Malta  Malta Financial Services 
Authority 
According to rules established 
by MFSA 
Receiver appointed by bankruptcy 
court and a liquidator 
Within 3 months 
Latvia Insolvency  petition  to 
Bankruptcy Court or to the 
Finance and Capital Market 




after the occurrence of a case 
of unavailability of deposits 
have submitted their claims to 
the liquidator or administrator 
or Commission  
Liquidator appointed under the 
Credit Institutions Law under the 
control of the Finance and Capital 
Market Commission 




National Bank of Slovakia 
files petition 
Failed bank or conservator 
must announce in media and 
publicize inside the bank 
Conservator  Within 5 days after deposits are inaccessible (frozen, 
become unavailable) the DPF decides a start of 
reimbursement; reimbursement ends within 3 months 
(may be prolonged twice by 3 months), special cases 
may be reimbursed within 3 years  
Slovenia  Bank of Slovinia  If bank or savings bank is 
declared bankrupt  guaranteed 
deposits will be repaid by a 
bank designated by the Bank 
of Slovenia to act as 
successor. This bank will 
provide the funds necessary 
for repaying guaranteed 
deposits. 
 
Bankruptcy court appoints trustee 
recommended by Bank of Slovinia  
Liability for guaranteed deposits will be assumed by 
Bank of  Slovinia  Payment must be made within 3 mo.   
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Legal Payment Requirements for Insured 
Deposits 
Hungary Hungarian  Financial 
Supervisory Authority 
 
Claim filed by customer.  
Bank and fund are obliged to 
inform depositors through 
daily press and 
announcements which provide 
information on where 
indemnity claims can be 
submitted and when the 
payments start. 
The consent of the Minister of 
Finance and of the President of the 
NBH is required for the HFSA to 
withdraw a credit institution's 
operating license. (CIFE Section 30 
(4))  When it withdraws a license, the 
HFSA shall make a resolution for 
winding up the credit institution or 
initiate liquidation. The HFSA shall 
initiate the liquidation of the credit 
institution if the operating license is 
withdrawn because the credit 
institution ails to pay any of its 
undisputed debts within five days of 
the date on which they are due or no 
longer possesses sufficient own funds 
(assets) for satisfying the known 
claims of creditors. In any other case, 
an order for the winding up of the 
institution may be issued.  
The special rules laid down in 
Section 176/A -185/H of the CIFE 
are applicable to the winding up and 
liquidation of credit institution, in 
addition to the rules of the 
Bankruptcy Act and the Companies 
Act. As a general rule, the winding 
up and liquidation proceeding of 
financial institutions may be 
conducted only by the HFSA’s 
nonprofit company.  
Payments must start within 15 days after deposits were 
frozen or after the bank's operational license was 
withdrawn, or after the bank's liquidation was 
announced, and complete the proceedings within three 
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Legal Payment Requirements for Insured 
Deposits 
Poland  Commission on Supervision 
which is part of the Polish 
National Bank files a 
petition with the bankruptcy 
court. Petition must be 
considered by the court 
within on month of receipt 
Payouts are made on the basis 
of a list of depositors of the 
bank, for which bankruptcy 
has been declared by a court. 
A list of depositors is drafted 
by the trustee in bankruptcy 
within 30 days from the date 
of announcing bankruptcy and 
is presented to the Fund 
Management Board.  After 
checking the list of depositors, 
within 7 days the Fund 
Management Board assumes 
and issues to the public 
information for a written 
nationwide announcement, as 
well as informs the entities 
covered by the guarantee 
system of the resolution on 
transferring to the trustee in 
bankruptcy the sum of 
guaranteed funds which is to 
be paid out 
Receiver appointed by bankruptcy 
court 
  The trustee in bankruptcy executes payment of the 
guaranteed funds according to the schedule accepted by 
the Fund Management Board, but not later than 30 
days from receiving the sums from the Fund for 



















Lithuania  The Central Bank of 
Lithuania as banking 
supervisor is empowered to 
close a bank  
The Council of the Insurance 
Company announces the 
procedure for paying insurance 
compensations in the 
Valstybės Žinios. The Co. 
announces the place and time 
of paying insurance claims in 
at least 2 Lithuanian daily 
newspapers. To get paid, a 




Administrator appointed by the  
Central Bank of Lithuania is 
empowered to initiate bankruptcy 
proceedings which are in turn 
administered by a court appointed 
receiver. 
Payment must be made within 3 months after funds are 
unavailable or bankruptcy declared.  May be extended 
3 months twice by the Council of the Insurance 
Company.  
 




POSSIBLE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS DIFFERENCES IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
 
 
•     Account coverage 
•     Maximum amount 
•     Type of account, e.g., inter-bank 
•     Foreign currency deposits 
•     Coinsurance 
•     Netting 
 
•    Ownership 
•    Private vs. public (government) 
 
•     Funding (premiums) 
•     Ex-ante vs. ex-post 
•     Magnitude 
•     Risk-based vs. flat 
•     Regular vs. “topping up” 
 
•     Reserve fund 
•     Minimum magnitude 
•     Voluntary or required 
 
•     Government support 
•     Explicit (official) vs. implicit 
•     Credibility of private funding (premiums) 
 
•      Speed of payment if insolvency 
•     Insured depositors - to par value 
•     Uninsured depositors - to market (recovery) value 




•  Claim filed 
•  Automatically 
•  By claimant     
•       Pre-insolvency intervention 
•     Prompt correction action (PCA) 
 
•       Declaration of insolvency 
•     Private creditors or government agency 
•     Insurance agency vs. other 
•     Closure rule vs. discretion (forbearance) 
 
•       Insolvency resolution 
•     Administered by insurance agency, other agencies, or 
       bankruptcy court 
•     Least cost resolution (LCR) 
•     Insurer serves as receiver/conservator 
•     Too big to fail 
 
•       Membership 
•     Mandatory or voluntary  
 
•  Other 
•  Coinsurance 
•  Offsetting 






LIKELY IMPLICATIONS FOR HOST COUNTRY TREATMENT OF FOREIGN BANK SUBSIDIARIES OF INSOLVENT 
PARENT OR SUBSIDIARY BANKS BY RELATIVE SIZE OF BANK IN COUNTRY 
 
 
          Home Country (Parent) 
         Large Bank  Small Bank 
         Solvent Insolvent Solvent Insolvent 
               








NP: No  problem 
RR: Reputation  risk/asset protection 
PC:  Parent choice of rescue or walk and resolution with asset protection 
R:  Resolution with asset protection 
*:  Parent likely to rescue 





•  Parent bank likely to attempt to “repatriate” assets at foreign subsidiaries in anticipation of official insolvency so host needs to 
protect subsidiary assets. 
•  Abstracts from functionality concerns re computer/records/senior management availability for operating subsidiary as 
independent (stand-alone) facility after insolvency and legal closure of either the subsidiary or parent 





  SUMMARY OF PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION PROVISIONS OF THE  
 FEDERAL  DEPOSIT  INSURANCE CORPORATION IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1991 
 
 






   
Risk Based 
 

























2. Adequately  capitalized 
 































   
 
 
1.  Suspend dividends and management fees 
2.  Require capital restoration plan 
3.  Restrict asset growth 
4.  Approval required for acquisitions, branching, 
and new activities 
5.  No brokered deposits 
 
1. Order  recapitalization 
2.  Restrict inter-affiliate transactions 
3.  Restrict deposit interest rates 
4.  Restrict certain other activities 
5.  Any other action that would better 































4. Significantly  undercapitalized 
 
1.  Same as for Zone 3 
2. Order  recapitalization* 
3.  Restrict inter-affiliate transactions* 
4.  Restrict deposit interest rates* 
5.  Pay of officers restricted 
 
2. Conservatorship  or  receivership if fails 
to submit or implement plan or 
recapitalize pursuant to order 
3.  Any other Zone 5 provision, if such 












































   
 
 
1.  Same as for Zone 4 
2.  Receiver/conservator within 90 days* 
3.  Receiver if still in Zone 5 four quarters after 
becoming critically under-capitalized 
4.  Suspend payments on subordinated debt* 








•  Not required if primary supervisor determines action would not serve purpose of prompt corrective action or if certain other conditions are met. 
SOURCE:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
 
 
  Table 11 
Country name   
Sources of Information 
Old Members  http://www.oba.hu/index.php?m=article&aid=190, 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/interest/2003_bank_survey,http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/bankruptcy/bankruptcy_gen_en.htm 
http://www.efdi.net/participantsDetails.asp?IdParticipants=1&Category=members 
   
Austria Hall(2001), http://www.einlagensicherung.at 
Belgium http://www.fondsdeprotection.be/files/reglement_dintervention_en.pdf, http://www.protectionfund.be 
Denmark http://www.gii.dk/, http://www.indskydergarantifonden.dk  
Finland http://www.pankkiyhdistys.fi/english/index.html, http://www.talletussuojarahasto.fi  
France http://www.garantiedesdepots.fr/spip/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=16, http://www.garantiedesdepots.fr 
Germany 
 
Deposit Guarantee and Investor Compensation Act 1998. 
http://wdsbeta.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2001/03/30/000094946_01032007445638/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf, 
http://www.bankenverband.de/pic/artikelpic/082006/0607_entschaedigung_en.pdf, http://www.bdb.de 
Greece http://www.hdgf.gr/binary/hdgf_Law.pdf, http://www.hdgf.gr  
Ireland http://www.ifsra.ie/frame_main.asp?pg=/consumer/cr_cs_dp.asp&nv=/consumer/cr_nav.asp, http://www.centralbank.ie  
Italy http://www.fitd.it/en/deposit_guarantee/deposit_insurance.htm, http://www.fitd.it 
Luxembourg http://www.agdl.lu/pdf/FAQ_0505_EN.pdf,http://www.pwc.com/lu/eng/ins-sol/publ/pwc_banking_050493_uk.pdf, http://www.agdl.lu 
Netherlands Hall(2001),http://www.finansbank.nl/finansbank/netherlands/english/consumer_banking/savings/top_interest_base_account/cgs, http://www.dnb.nl 
Portugal http://www.bportugal.pt/default_e.htm,  http://www.bportugal.pt/publish/legisl/rgicsf2004_e.pdf, http://www.fgd.bportugal.pt 
Spain http://www.fgd.es/Indexin.htm, http://www.fgd.es  
Sweden http://www.ign.se/English/index.html, http://www.ign.se  
United Kingdom  FSCS annual report 2003/2004 and International deposit insurance survey, http://www.fscs.org.uk  
http://www.fscs.org.uk/consumer/how_to_claim/deposits/ 
  
New Members  http://www.oba.hu/index.php?m=article&aid=190, http://www.worldbank.org/research/interest/2003_bank_survey 
  
Cyprus http://www.centralbank.gov.cy/media/pdf/BCRGE_DEPOSITPROTECTION.pdf, Establishment of Deposit Protection Scheme Regulations of 2000, 
http://www.centralbank.gov.cy  




Hungary http://www.iadi.org/html/App/SiteContent/Member%20Profile%20Hungary.pdf, www.ndif.hu, 




Lithuania  http://www.idf.lt/eng/about.html, http://www.tdd.lt/idf , http://www.lrkt.lt/dokumentai/1996/n6a0418a.htm 
Malta http://www.compensationschemes.org.mt/pages/default.asp,http://www.compensationschemes.org.mt/pages/files/DEPOSITOR%20COMPENSATION%20SCH
EME%20REG-LN369%20[English].pdf, http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/bankruptcy/bankruptcy_mlt_en.htm, http://www.compensationschemes.org.mt 
Poland http://www.bfg.pl/u235/navi/27927;THE  LAW of 14 December 1994 on the Bank Guarantee Fund, http://www.bfg.pl/_itemserver/pdf/rap2005_ang_03_ok.pdf, 
http://www.bfg.pl  
Slovak Republic  http://www.slovak.sk/business/legislation/protection_bank_5.htm, http://www.fovsr.sk 
Slovenia http://www.bsi.si/html/eng/deposit_insurance_system/description/description1.htm, http://www.bsi.si/en/bank-of-slovenia.asp?MapaId=84, 
http://www.bsi.si 